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When President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) into law on August 22, 1996, programs to strengthen child 
support enforcement and improve receipt efforts were established.  However, the lives of 
welfare recipients who were receiving child support were forever changed.  These single 
mothers would now have to attempt to find employment, no matter what their skill level, in 
order to keep their welfare benefits for the five-year time limit mandated by this legislation.  
Some of the new welfare-to-work rules helped raise welfare recipients out of poverty by 
helping them gain work experience and various job skills.  However, most jobs found by 
welfare recipients provided low wages, limited or no benefits, and no flexibility when it came 
to childcare situations. 
 Before 1996, custodial parents were allowed to keep the first $50 per month in child 
support collected on their behalf without their welfare benefits being reduced.  However, 
PRWORA now allowed states to increase or decrease the amount of this child support 
disregard.  Many states, including Iowa, decided to keep the child support paid by non-
custodial parents in order to offset welfare payments. 
 This thesis includes a brief history of welfare and child support policies and the 
recovery by states of their welfare costs, with an analysis of “pass-through” and “disregard” 
policies stemming from the passage of PRWORA.  PRWORA eliminated mandatory pass-
through.  As of June 2009, approximately 25 states keep all of the child support paid by the 
non-custodial parent as reimbursement for the custodial parent receiving welfare benefits 
(Center for Law and Social Policy, 2009).   
x 
 
For this study, custodial and non-custodial parents, judges, and administrators from 
the Iowa Department of Human Services were interviewed.  They were asked about their 
experiences with the formal child support and welfare systems, and how they navigated 
through the rules and regulations.  Respondents also had a chance to give suggestions as to 
how the welfare and child support systems could be improved.   
This thesis reports the effects that covert non-compliance and covert support have on 
custodial parents who receive child support, and on non-custodial parents who pay child 
support.  It also reports that when child support is not made readily available to families who 
use welfare benefits, custodial parents may choose to engage in covert non-compliance, 
covert support, and/or informal support. 
Most of the respondents had negative experiences with the formal welfare and child 
support systems.  They understood the rules, regulations, and eligibility requirements of the 
programs they were involved in, but did not always agree with the stipulations.  Some of the 
respondents also felt that welfare benefits and child support should be two separate financial 
supplements. 
My recommendations include an educational campaign for Iowa Department of 
Human Services administrators, workers, and clients, a switch in federal marriage promotion 
funding to a positive parenting curriculum, job training, and skill building programs, and a 
policy brief of my research that can be used by various policymakers to help understand the 
plight of welfare families in central Iowa and how future policies concerning child support 
and welfare can be beneficial to both the state and low-income families.  
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This research focused on the involvement of custodial and non-custodial parents in 
the formal child support enforcement and welfare systems.   It questioned the impact, if any, 
that welfare policies concerning child support collection and distribution might have on both 
parents, and on their decision of whether or not to engage in covert support and/or covert 
non-compliance.  In the long term, it is hoped that this research will influence the Iowa 
Department of Human Services, Iowa Child Support Recovery Unit, and other stakeholders 
to improve the child support and welfare systems, and to create programs that will help low-
income parents be more active participants in these systems.   
 To gain a basic understanding of child support enforcement and the welfare system, 
Chapter 2 provides a brief history of child support and welfare policies.  Research 
investigating the impact of child support pass-through and disregard rules, covert support and 
covert non-compliance on custodial parents and their receipt of child support and non-
custodial parents and their payment of child support is also examined. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the four theoretical perspectives that this research is based on: 
systems theory, family process theory, the ecology of human development, and feminist 
theory.  Research questions and expectations are also introduced. 
 Chapter 4 discusses the qualitative research methods that were used to collect and 
analyze data, the sample that was involved in this thesis, the interview questions that were 
used, and the interview protocol that was followed. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 conclude this study with a discussion of findings, policy 
recommendations, and implications for further research. 
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Definition of Terms 
When discussing child support and welfare, it is necessary to have a basic knowledge 
of terms and concepts in order to better understand the research (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2007).   
Child support: financial support paid by a parent to help support a child or children of 
whom they do not have custody.  Child support agreements can be entered into voluntarily or 
ordered by a court or a properly empowered administrative agency, depending on the laws of 
each state. 
Child support enforcement: the application of remedies to obtain payment of a child or 
medical support obligation contained in a child and/or spousal order.   
Covert non-compliance: the decision by a custodial parent to pretend to comply with the 
formal child support system, while withholding important information such as the true 
identity, location, and earnings of the non-custodial parent. 
Covert support: financial and/or material contributions made by non-custodial parents that 
are not reported to the formal child support system, and are meant to intentionally defraud the 
system. 
Custodial parent: the person who has primary care, custody, and control of the child; the 
parent to whom child support is owed. 
Disregard: amount of child support that the custodial parent can keep without a reduction in 
welfare benefits. 
Formal child support: money that the non-custodial parent pays directly to either the state 
or the custodial parent. 
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Formal child support system: government agency that exists in every state that locates non-
custodial parents; establishes, enforces, and modifies child support orders; and collects and 
distributes child support. 
Full disregard: allowing the full amount of child support paid to be distributed to the 
custodial parent without affecting the level of welfare benefits received. 
Informal child support: money that the non-custodial parent pays directly to the custodial 
parent that is not intended to defraud the formal child support system. 
Non-custodial parent: parent who does not have primary care, custody, or control of the 
child, but has an obligation to pay child support. 
Pass-through: provision by which some of a child support payment collected on behalf of a 
welfare recipient is disbursed directly to that parent.   
Welfare: state and federal programs that offer cash and other assistance to low-income 
individuals and families. 
Welfare recipient: person who receives cash and other assistance from the state and federal 
government. 
Zero disregard: occurs when the full amount of child support paid is distributed to the 




CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In 2005, 6.8 million custodial parents who were due child support through either legal 
awards or informal arrangements were owed an annual average of $5600, or an average of 
$465 per month.  Overall, custodial parents reported receiving $25.9 billion directly from the 
non-custodial parent for support of their children in 2005 (Grall, 2007).  According to the 
April 2006 Current Population Survey, sixty-one percent of all custodial parents received at 
least one type of non-cash support, such as gifts or coverage of expenses, on behalf of their 
children (Grall, 2007).  Custodial parents who had a child support order or agreement were 
more likely to receive non-cash support (65.3%) than those custodial parents who did not 
have awards (55.3%).  The most common type of non-cash support received by custodial 
parents was birthday, holiday, or other gifts.  Other support received included clothing, 
diapers, groceries, medical expenses unrelated to health insurance, and child care (Grall, 
2007). 
There are many issues that involve the welfare system and child support distribution 
and receipt policies.  Many rules and regulations are established by these policies, which can 
confuse low-income parents and policymakers alike.  In the first section of this literature 
review, the history of welfare reform policies and their effects on child support receipt and 
enforcement is discussed.  In the second section, the different ways that both custodial and 
non-custodial parents may choose to forego the formal child support system is discussed.   
Welfare and Child Support Receipt 
 On August 14, 1935, the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program was created as 
part of the Social Security Act (Wisconsin Historical Society, 1936).  This program allowed 
states to provide financial assistance to low-income families who met specific requirements, 
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such as a non-custodial parent not providing child support.  The 1935 Social Security Act 
was the first major piece of welfare legislation in the United States.  The ADC program was 
renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962.  The words “families 
with” were added because of concern that program rules discouraged marriage (Blank & 
Blum, 1997).   
The first major federal child support legislation was the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) in 1950.  This act provided a system for interstate 
enforcement of child support without the custodial parent having to travel to the state where 
the non-custodial parent lived.  It also helped to establish paternity, locate absent non-
custodial parents, and either establish, modify, or enforce a support order across state lines.  
In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed into law Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, which 
created the federal child support enforcement system.  This program was to be a partnership 
between state and federal governments, with state governments having primary responsibility 
to operate the program.  The federal government was responsible for such tasks as 
establishing a parent locator service, technical assistance, and certifying cases for referral to 
federal courts and the Internal Revenue Service for enforcement and collection (Pirog & 
Ziol-Guest, 2006).  States were provided federal matching funds for child support 
enforcement for AFDC cases.  Federal legislation was also passed that would allow the 
government to garnish the wages of non-custodial parents in order to satisfy child support 
obligations (Pirog & Ziol-Guest, 2006).  Since 1975, federal law has required that child 
support obligations remain in place even if the non-custodial parent declares bankruptcy 
(Garfinkel, McLanahan, Meyer, & Seltzer, 1998).  Since 1981, child support agencies have 
been permitted to collect spousal support on behalf of custodial parents, and, in 1984, were 
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required to petition for medical support as part of the majority of child support orders (U.S 
House of Representatives, 2008). 
The 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments required that states provide equal 
services for welfare and non-welfare families, and provided stricter measures against 
delinquent non-custodial parents, such as mandatory wage withholding if support payments 
were delinquent by one month and the creation of liens against real and personal property in 
the amount of overdue support.  A pass-through policy was also established that required at 
least $50 of a monthly child support payment that was collected to be distributed directly to 
the custodial parent (Lerman & Sorensen, 2001).  For example, if a custodial parent in Iowa 
had a $300 child support order and received $361 in welfare benefits, the parent would 
receive $50 of child support and the remaining $250 would go to the state for reimbursement 
of welfare benefits on behalf of the custodial parent.   
Throughout the last twenty years, there have been several state and federal laws 
established in an effort to enforce and collect child support.  The Family Support Act of 1988 
contained several provisions to strengthen child support enforcement for AFDC cases.  The 
Act required judges and other officials to use state guidelines for determining child support 
award amounts, and mandated three-year reviews and adjustments of cases involving welfare 
families who were receiving child support (Edin, 1995).  The Act also set state standards for 
paternity establishment, allowed for federal reimbursement for the costs of paternity testing, 
mandated genetic testing in disputed cases, and required immediate wage withholding for all 
new or modified orders being enforced by the states, beginning in November 1990.  All 
states were required to develop and maintain statewide automated tracking and monitoring 
systems by October 1995, or face federal penalties (Lerman & Sorensen, 2001).   
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The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 required states to adopt procedures 
for voluntary paternity acknowledgement due to the success of several hospital-based 
programs (Farrel, Glosser, & Gardiner, 2003).  Nationally, the number of children for whom 
paternity was established or acknowledged increased to 1.8 million in FY2008, of which 1.2 
million involved in-hospital or other paternity acknowledgements (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2008). 
 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 made several changes to the federal child support 
enforcement program.  One of these changes established a “Families First” policy that 
provided incentives to states to encourage them to allow more child support to go to former 
welfare families (U.S. House of Representatives, 2008).     
Welfare and Child Support Enforcement 
One of the most influential pieces of legislation involving welfare and child support 
enforcement was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996.  This was passed during the Clinton era when he made clear:  
“I want a national system of national child support enforcement because 
governments don’t raise children; people do.”(Blank & Ellwood, 2002, p. 749) 
 
One of the most important premises of PRWORA was holding both custodial and 
non-custodial parents financially accountable for their children.  For example, states were 
now able to deny food stamps to non-custodial parents who were behind in their child 
support payments.  This new law was the first effort of the federal government to withhold 
welfare benefits from low-income non-custodial parents as a penalty for not satisfying their 
child support obligation (Garfinkel, et al., 1998).  PRWORA also allowed states to design 
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their own welfare-to-work programs, and established a lifetime limit on receipt of welfare 
benefits.   
One of the most significant aspects of this act was to eliminate the federal 
requirement that states pass through the first $50 of child support that was paid to welfare 
families. States were now given the option of how much child support would go to these 
families (Venohr, Price, Van Wert, & Anders, 2002).  For example, in Iowa, if a custodial 
parent had a $300 support order and received $361 in welfare benefits, any child support paid 
by the non-custodial parent went directly to the state for reimbursement of welfare benefits 
on behalf of the custodial parent. 
One of the goals of the child support enforcement system was to provide 
economically vulnerable single-parent families with an important source of income (Cancian, 
Meyer, & Roff, 2007).  If child support provides enough income to help a custodial parent 
become economically self-sufficient by combining child support with earnings and other 
types of income, child support may indirectly reduce reliance on, and the costs of, welfare to 
a state (Cancian, et al., 2007).   However, because some of the child support collected was 
used to offset government costs, it did not significantly raise a custodial parent’s income.  
Not receiving collected child support was one reason why parents were less likely to 
cooperate with child support authorities.  Questions arose from both custodial and non-
custodial parents: Why should there be any cooperation with a system in which the children 
do not directly benefit when the support is paid?  (Cancian, Meyer, & Roff, 2006).  Within 
PRWORA, there was a “pay families first” section that stated that if a custodial parent went 
to work and no longer received welfare benefits, that parent would receive all of the child 
support that was owed and collected for his or her children (Blank & Ellwood, 2002).  The 
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only way that a custodial parent could receive the full amount of child support was to leave 
welfare and find a job. 
Sorensen and Halpern (1999) examined whether in-hospital paternity establishment 
policies and immediate wage withholding increased child support receipt for single and 
previously married mothers.  This study found that in-hospital paternity establishment 
programs had a positive effect on child support receipt for single mothers who did not 
receive welfare benefits, while immediate wage withholding had a positive impact on child 
support receipt among previously married mothers who did receive welfare benefits.  
Sorensen and Halpern (1999) also suggested that single mothers receiving welfare had little 
incentive to cooperate with paternity establishment because most of the child support 
collected would be given to the state as reimbursement for welfare expenditures. 
Often, parents chose to act covertly and agreed to create informal arrangements, so 
that any payments the non-custodial parent made went directly to the child (Cabrera & 
Peters, 2000).  In some situations, mothers had lost contact with the fathers of their children, 
or did not want to have to interact with someone who was emotionally or physically abusive, 
incarcerated, or addicted.  In these situations, supporting the children might then fall on the 
mother’s current cohabitating partner, even if he was not the father of her children.  
However, when partners lost their jobs or stopped financial support, these men were forced 
out of the home and back onto the street (Edin & Lein, 1997). 
As the following studies demonstrate, custodial parents often choose the most 
economically beneficial way to support their children.  These ways include creating informal 
and/or covert arrangements or following formal support regulations.   
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In a seminal study, Cancian, Meyer, and Caspar (2008) concluded that when custodial 
parents were allowed to keep all of the child support paid on their behalf, paternity 
establishment occurred more quickly, non-custodial parents were more likely to pay support, 
and custodial parents received more support for their children.  The focus of the study was a 
cohort of single mothers who participated in the state of Wisconsin’s welfare program 
entitled Wisconsin Works (W-2) between September 1997 and July 1998.  The children of 
these women and the children’s non-custodial parents were also included in the study.  The 
control group consisted of custodial mothers with a child support order at the time of W-2 
entry.  The experimental group consisted of custodial mothers without any recent welfare 
history.   
The researchers concluded that Wisconsin’s full disregard had not only been able to 
increase the amount of child support received by custodial parents, but also increased child 
support payments overall.  The full disregard was also associated with increases in the 
percentage of non-custodial parents paying support and the amount paid by these parents.  In 
Wisconsin, the cost of passing through all child support to families was largely offset by 
reductions in state and federal benefit programs.  Because the federal government assumed 
most of the increased costs of the W-2 program, whereas most of the reductions in costs were 
accrued by the state, there was a net cost to the federal government, while the state 
experienced a net savings, with the costs largely offsetting each other (Cancian, et al., 2008).   
This study concluded that the full disregard policy would likely decrease the 
importance of child support as a long-term source of income for custodial parents and their 
children.  The researchers also felt that it made sense to allow children, rather than taxpayers, 
to directly benefit from the payment of child support (Cancian, et al., 2008).  From their 
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results, they concluded that Wisconsin’s full disregard has been able to increase child support 
amounts received by low-income families, and the child support payments themselves have 
increased.  The full disregard was also associated with the number of fathers who paid child 
support and the amount they paid (Cancian, et al., 2008).  The researchers found it more 
ironic that the full disregard had come at little cost to the government.  In Wisconsin, the cost 
of passing through all child support paid to welfare families was largely offset by reductions 
in other benefit programs.  Because most of the increased costs of the Wisconsin experiment 
were absorbed by the federal government, and whereas most of the cost reductions accrue to 
the state government, there was a net cost to the federal government, while the state 
government experienced a net savings, with the costs offsetting each other (Cancian, et al., 
2008).  In current society where poverty rates are increasing and the number of families 
receiving government assistance is also on the rise, it is becoming more critical for the formal 
child support system to not put so much emphasis on government cost recovery, and to focus 
more on increasing individual and family self-sufficiency (Cancian, et al., 2008). 
Covert Non-Compliance and Covert Support 
 In a major study conducted by Edin (1995), data collected from 214 welfare mothers 
in four cities showed that although they were mandated by law to pursue child support in 
cooperation with their state child support enforcement office, many mothers who wanted to 
remain on welfare, but did not want to reveal the father’s identity or any other specific 
information, engaged in covert non-compliance.   
Mothers who engaged in covert non-compliance felt they had good reasons for doing 
so.  In their negotiations with the welfare system, the child support enforcement office, and 
their child’s father, these mothers acted in a strategic manner to maximize their family’s 
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potential economic and social gains.  The most important finding in Edin’s study (1995) was 
that according to the mothers’ reports, the fathers of their children were much more 
financially involved than was reported in official statistics.  Thirty-three percent of the 
women reported that they received financial support from the fathers of their children, though 
only 14 percent received any of that support through official channels.  An additional 30 
percent of the mothers stated that instead of receiving cash assistance, they received in-kind 
contributions, such as diapers, school clothes, and holiday gifts.  Even though these 
contributions constituted a small but crucial portion of their monthly budgets, in combination 
with other income, the mothers who were engaging in covert non-compliance were able to 
survive within a system that paid a level of cash assistance that continued to keep them in 
poverty. 
Edin’s study (1995) found that a majority of the mothers that were interviewed 
complied with the formal regulations of the child support system and provided identifying 
information for at least one of the fathers of their children.  As shown in Table 1, 134 
mothers complied with child support officials, but only 31 actually received any support from 
the formal system.  In Table 1, these numbers overlap in the sample, because there were 297 
fathers for the 214 mothers involved in the study.  One hundred and twelve mothers failed to 
receive formal support from at least one of the fathers for whom they submitted information 
to child support enforcement officials.  Eleven mothers had cooperated for two fathers, but 
received support from only one of them.  Sixty-three percent of mothers complied with the 
system for at least one father.  However, 57 percent of mothers claimed they engaged in 
some form of covert non-compliance.   
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Table 1.  AFDC Recipients Who Cooperated with OCSE and Who Did Not by Main 
Reason (Columns Do Not Add to 100%)* 
 Number % of Total 
Cooperated with OCSE for One or More Fathers 134 63 
Cooperated and Received Formal Support for One or More Fathers 31 14 
Cooperated, but no Formal Support Received for One or More Fathers 112 52 
Main Reason for Cooperation:   
Father(s) Unemployed 20 10 
Father(s) Incarcerated 20 10 
Father(s) Not Found 36 17 
Good-Cause Exemption 7 3 
Father(s) Unknown 2 1 
In Process 41 19 
   
Did Not Cooperate with OCSE, but Engaged In Covert Non-Compliance 122 57 
Covert Non-Compliance and Covert Support 50 24 
Main Reason for Non-Cooperation:   
Financial Gain 32 15 
Father-Child Tie 46 21 
Father’s Economic Situation 27 13 
   
Covert Non-Compliance and No Covert Support 75 35 
Main Reason:   
Material versus Emotional Support 9 9 
Fear of Reprisal 18 8 
Exclusive Control Over Child 25 12 
No Legitimate Claim 14 7 
Mothers gave several reasons for their cooperation or non-cooperation.  Edin coded only the main reason 
mothers gave for their behavior in regard to each of their children's fathers; N=214 
 
As shown in Table 1, 24 percent of mothers participated in both covert support and 
covert non-compliance rather than relying on only formal child support receipt from their 
child’s father.  It needs to be understood that the women who were interviewed in the study 
had multiple fathers of their children, and the behaviors were sometimes different for each 
father.  Some fathers did cooperate with their children’s mother and paid their child support, 
while others chose to participate in covert support and covert non-compliance. 
This research concerning the prevalence of covert support and non-covert compliance 
illustrates that even though these acts violate welfare rules and regulations, some mothers see 
them as the only way to receive any support for their children.  Edin (1995) offered three 
reasons why she believed that covert behavior was increasing.  The first reason was that 
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some mothers were more apt to get more money from the father through covert support than 
the $50 disregard that the welfare system would allow them to keep.  Sixty-four percent of 
mothers reported that they received covert support because they were better off financially 
than if they received their support through official channels.   
The second reason was that most of the father’s economic conditions were not 
conducive to satisfying a regular child support obligation.  They were either not making 
enough money to financially take care of themselves, which in turn drastically hindered their 
payment of child support, or they were involved in cash-only ventures or illegal activities.  
Mothers would rather get some support than see the father get arrested or be penalized with 
other sanctions.  If jail time and/or sanctions did occur, there would not be any formal or 
informal child support from the father.  Thirty-six percent of mothers who received covert 
support did not receive any more money than they could have potentially received through 
the formal child support system.  
The third reason that Edin (1995) stated was that mothers believed that if there was 
not any “interference” from child support enforcement officials and if they were able to 
establish a satisfactory support arrangement with the father, the relationship between the 
father and child would be strengthened and enhanced.  The father would be more apt to 
spend time with his child if he knew that he would not face any sanctions if he could not 
satisfy his entire child support obligation.  According to the mothers in the study, having 
fathers pay through the formal child support system decreased their pride in parenthood and 
eliminated any sense of reward for satisfying their financial obligation to their child.  
However, the same mothers who received covert support and engaged in non-covert 
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compliance did use the formal child support system as a threat if the fathers did not honor 
their child support obligation. 
As shown in Table 1, 61% (75/122) of mothers did not receive formal nor informal 
support.  Edin (1995) suggested four reasons why these mothers voluntarily gave up their 
rights to child support.  The first reason was their emphasis on the father-child relationship.  
Some mothers felt that it was better to strengthen and enhance this relationship and receive 
emotional support for their child than to try and collect formal support and possibly decrease 
the amount of positive interaction between the father and child.  The second reason was that 
some mothers wanted to have full control over the welfare of their children.  They did not 
want any support from the father, and did not want to feel like they had to “answer” to 
someone if they accepted any support.  Thirty-three percent of the mothers did not pursue 
establishing any kind of support obligation because they did not want to open the door to 
unwanted contact with the absent father.  Many of the women valued their freedom from 
depending on someone else, or believed that the father was a negative influence on the  
children.  Other mothers were fearful that if the fathers were made to pay child support, they 
would expect shared custody.  The mothers did not trust the fathers to adequately care for 
their children. 
The third reason that mothers chose not to receive any support was that they feared 
physical abuse or other forms of harassment from their child’s father.  Their safety and the 
safety of their children were more important than having any contact with the father.  
Twenty-four percent of the mothers in the study stated they did not seek to establish any type 
of support obligation because they feared physical violence, but still believed that the state 
would not grant them a good-cause exemption if they told the truth.  This was not an 
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unreasonable belief since records from the Office of Child Support Enforcement showed that 
nearly one-third of those custodial parents who requested good cause exemptions were 
denied (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1990).  The fourth reason was that 
there was no long-term or substantial relationship with the child’s father.  Nineteen percent 
of the mothers did not see any reason to obligate or involve men in their lives whom they 
hardly knew, much less trusted.   
Edin (1995) offered several policy recommendations that would help welfare mothers 
not rely on public assistance or formal child support.  The first recommendation was to 
establish and collect child support awards just as Social Security taxes are collected, 
automatically adjusting for changes in earnings.  A child support “tax” could be enacted so 
that extremely low-wage fathers would be assessed realistic amounts, and also be able to 
handle payments much more easily.  The second recommendation was to guarantee a 
minimum monthly benefit to custodial parents whose former partners have low earnings and 
are unable to make any substantial payments through the formal system.  Her third 
recommendation was to improve the wages of unskilled and semi-skilled fathers who were 
having difficulty satisfying their child support obligation.  One way this could happen would 
be to involve fathers in Parents’ Fair Share demonstrations that were established by the 1988 
Family Support Act.  These programs provided work, job training, and parenting classes to 
unemployed and non-custodial fathers.  The child support obligations of these fathers were 
held in abeyance while fathers participated in the program (Garfinkel, et al., 1998).  Another 
way to help low-income fathers satisfy their child support obligations would be to advocate 
for a “self-sufficiency wage.”  A self-sufficiency wage is defined as a wage that “generates 
an annual income that covers basic living expenses, such as shelter, food, childcare, 
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transportation, one telephone, health care, and clothing” (League of Women Voters of Ames, 
Iowa, 2005, p. 5).   
Eden (1995) concluded that if policymakers and stakeholders want to see low-income 
fathers contribute to their child support obligation and single mothers attain self-sufficiency 
and leave welfare, the wages of skilled and semi-skilled men and women must definitely 
increase.   
“The best way to mend the current system for welfare-reliant children is to create a 
system that takes into account real-life situations of both mothers and fathers, as well 
as norms regarding responsibility and obligation”(Edin, 1995, p. 228). 
 
Guaranteeing Child Support 
Guaranteeing child support to custodial parents was the topic of an influential study 
in 1980 conducted by the Institute for Research on Poverty in Madison, Wisconsin 
(Garfinkel, McLanahan, & Robins, 1992).  The Institute envisioned the concept of child 
support assurance as holding non-custodial parents accountable for their child support 
obligations, while at the same time guaranteeing a minimum benefit to custodial parents 
(Garfinkel, et al., 1992).  The three components of the child support assurance system were 
child support guidelines which established the child support award; routine withholding 
which deducted child support owed by the non-custodial parent from reported wages and 
other income; and an assured child support benefit which was a government guarantee of 
child support to custodial parents legally entitled to child support (Garfinkel, et al., 1992).  In 
most states, a child support assurance system would be generous enough to exclude single 
mothers from having to receive welfare benefits, but they would still be eligible for food 
stamps and medical assistance.  This benefit would not be means-tested, so mothers could 
keep all of their wages if they found employment (Edin, 1995). 
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The public policy initiatives mentioned above, among others, have not given much 
support to the development of positive fathering behaviors in non-traditional families 
because they were originally based in a traditional family context: a married couple with 
children.  The laws that were based within PRWORA pressured fathers to pay child support, 
but did not help them overcome barriers that were preventing payment, such as unstable 
employment (Miller, 2006).  These policies have mainly focused on a father’s payment of 
child support as the most important form of positive father involvement and responsibility 
(Cabrera & Peters, 2000; Miller, 2006).  Instead of using federal funding to establish and 
maintain marriage promotion programs, there should be a mandate to create programs that 
accept the choices of low-income parents who choose not to marry and provide them with 
opportunities to become more responsible providers for their children.   
Formal and Informal Child Support 
Within the state and federal child support systems, formal support consists of the 
money that the non-custodial parent pays either directly to the state or to the custodial parent 
as a result of a child support order.  Informal support consists of any money that the non-
custodial parent pays directly to the custodial parent that is not required and not intended to 
defraud the formal child support system. 
In a study on the relationship between non-resident father involvement and child 
well-being in welfare families, Greene and Moore (2000) examined three areas of non-
resident father involvement: father-child visitation, formal child support payments, and 
informal child support.  Their findings revealed that while only 16.6 percent of fathers 
provided formal child support during the past year of the study, 42.3 percent provided 
informal child support and 67 percent visited their child at least once within the past year of 
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the study.  Fathers prefer these informal systems because they feel that they have more 
control over how the money for the child is spent (Cabrera & Peters, 2000).  The researchers 
also found that informal support and father-child visitation were closely associated.  The 
closer in proximity that the father and child were, the more apt the father was to give 
financial support.   
When it came to formal support, mothers were more willing to report accurate 
information about the fathers to child support enforcement officials because they knew where 
the fathers lived and worked based on their close proximity to the child.  It was also easier 
for child support enforcement agencies to collect from intra-state fathers rather than from 
inter-state fathers (Greene & Moore, 2000).  In general, they also found that monetary and 
material contributions from the father, especially informal support, were positively associated 
with more positive child well-being outcomes. 
In 2001, Waller and Plotnick analyzed reasons why the child support system often 
seemed to fail low-income families.  They found three components of PRWORA that 
negatively affected child support receipt (Waller & Plotnick, 2001; Lipscomb, 2005).  The 
first component was that custodial parents must cooperate with the state in locating the non-
custodial parent, establishing paternity, and obtaining child support.  Failure to cooperate in 
establishing paternity could result in at least a 25 percent reduction in welfare benefits or a 
total cancellation of benefits.  The second component was that the custodial parent must 
assign all rights to child, spousal, and/or medical support to the state for up to the amount of 
welfare benefits received.  This included all current and past due support and continued as 
long as a family was receiving welfare benefits.  If the custodial parent refused to assign her 
rights to the state, her public assistance and medical benefits would be cancelled.  The 
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children would still receive public assistance and medical benefits, but the benefits would go 
directly to a payee, not the mother.   
The third component was that approximately 50 percent of states used the entire 
monthly child support payment to reimburse state and federal governments for welfare 
payments.  Because of this welfare reform legislation, the family would not receive the child 
support and usually faced a decrease in their standard of living.  The fourth component of 
welfare legislation that affected child support receipt was that no formal credit was given for 
informal payments made directly to the custodial parent, such as clothes, groceries, etc. 
 The research also suggested that there was a division between the goals of child 
support policy and what low-income parents desired from the formal child support system.  
This division made it extremely difficult for low-income parents to comply with existing 
policy, and also made policy reform problematic, as is seen throughout the studies that have 
been and will be discussed.  The researchers believed that there would be increased 
compliance rates within the formal child support system if low-income families perceived the 
system as more beneficial to their children and supportive of their efforts to establish 
satisfactory economic arrangements on their own (Waller & Plotnick, 2001).   
Waller and Plotnick (2001) also speculated as to why the child support system was 
not more effective for welfare families.  Their first premise was that many low-income, 
unmarried parents preferred informal support, including informal contributions from non-
custodial parents, because they believed it financially benefited their children and family 
more than relying on formal support.  Informal support was tangible, and could be used right 
away to take care of expenses.  It was also easier for fathers and their children to build a 
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stronger relationship because both parents created a satisfactory and informal financial 
arrangement that would increase the likelihood of father involvement.   
Their second premise was that welfare parents often did not comply with formal child 
support regulations because they thought of them as unfair, counterproductive, and/or 
punitive.  Parents felt that participation in the formal child support system would not 
significantly improve their child’s well-being, and could also create both emotional and 
financial conflicts between parents.  Some also felt that they could create a working 
relationship with the non-custodial parent on their own that would benefit all involved.  They 
saw this relationship as cooperative parenting and paternal involvement.  Their third premise 
as to why the child support system was not seen as more effective for welfare families was 
that many of these families often faced social and economic obstacles, such as low wages and 
unstable employment, or did not have the necessary information about how the child support 
system actually worked.  The Edin study (1995) also produced such results. 
All of these conditions stated above have made it much more difficult for welfare 
families to comply with formal child support regulations, even if they do not participate in 
covert non-compliance.  Low-income parents believe that child support should directly 
increase their children’s standard of living, while the pass-through regulation rests on the 
principle that the welfare system is responsible for support only when the non-custodial 
parent’s earnings do not meet the state’s minimum standard (Waller & Plotnick, 2001).  This 
seems to be a serious discrepancy between values and policies.  This could be construed as 
one of the main reasons that low-income parents may participate in covert non-compliance 
and covert support.  
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According to a 1996 study about reducing the child support welfare disincentive 
problem among low-income families, custodial and non-custodial parents often have an 
incentive to create an informal child support payment system so that the child can receive 
more than the $50 allowed per month without facing a reduction in welfare benefits (Bassi & 
Lerman, 1996).  The custodial parent could stay on welfare while receiving these informal 
child support payments since they were usually not enough to help them leave the welfare 
system (Miller, 2006).  However, if the custodial parent in this study obtained a job and was 
ready to leave the welfare system, she would be more apt to want to receive formal child 
support payments since these amounts were likely to be higher and more stable.  Even if 
those payments did not go through the formal child support system and an informal 
arrangement was established between the two parents, the non-custodial parent would most 
likely be willing to help out more financially since he would know that the money would be 
going directly to his child.  The payments would not be decreased by welfare rules and 
regulations. 
 These disincentives pose a serious threat to public policy.  The current pass-through 
policies of certain states encourage non-custodial parents to stay in the underground economy 
and pay their child support through informal channels.  Bassi & Lerman (1996) found that 
some low-income, non-custodial fathers viewed the government as worrying more about 
getting reimbursed for welfare payments and not worrying enough about raising the living 
standards of children.   
 In their FY2005-2009 Strategic Plan, the Office of Child Support Enforcement 
describes the programs they have established to help custodial parents receive the child 
support they are owed (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2004).  Four 
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protocols have been established within the strategic plan that state governments can 
implement in order to help welfare families.  The first protocol is to provide intensive child 
support services to families nearing their five-year time limit of receiving welfare benefits, 
continuing for the year after the assistance ends.  The second protocol is to ensure prompt 
payment of collections to families when their welfare benefits end.  The third protocol is to 
involve both parents in developing post-welfare transition plans, including the role of child 
support remaining independent of public assistance, review and modification of child support 
orders, and compromising on support arrearages when appropriate.  The fourth protocol is to 
use data reports to identify custodial parents who could close their cases with reliable receipt 
of child support.  It is the intention of the Office of Child Support Enforcement for states to 
implement these strategies and protocols in order to increase and strengthen child support 
collection and enforcement efforts and to make the system more user-friendly for the families 
that truly need assistance.  There is no research as of yet as to whether these strategies have 
been beneficial to low-income families receiving welfare benefits, or have established any 
government savings.  
Research Questions 
 This research focuses on the involvement of custodial parents in Iowa in the formal 
state child support enforcement and welfare systems and in covert child support 
arrangements.  Of particular interest are the effects that welfare program rules regarding the 
receipt and disbursement of child support have on the behavior of both custodial and non-
custodial parents. 
The specific research questions addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
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A. Does participation in the formal child support system and participation in covert child 
support agreements affect the income of custodial parents?  If so, which approach has 
a greater effect on income? 
B. Do welfare program rules regarding the receipt and disbursement of child support 
(e.g., pass-through and disregard rules) affect the willingness and likelihood of 
custodial parents to comply with formal child support rules and regulations? 
C. Does the effect of participating in a covert child support agreement on the income of 
custodial parents affect their willingness and likelihood to comply with formal child 
support rules and regulations? 
Research Expectations 
Expectation #1 
A. Participation in the formal child support system positively affects the income of 
custodial parents. 
B. Participation in covert child support agreements positively affects the income of 
custodial parents.  
C. Participation in the formal child support system and covert child support agreements 
has a greater positive effect on the income of custodial parents compared to 
participating only in covert child support agreements. 
D. Participation in the formal child support system and covert child support agreements 
has a greater positive effect on the income of custodial parents compared to 






A. Welfare program rules regarding the receipt of child support (e.g., disregard policies) 
negatively affect the willingness of custodial parents to comply with formal child 
support rules and regulations. 
B. Welfare program rules regarding the receipt of child support (e.g., disregard policies) 
negatively affect the likelihood of custodial parents to comply with formal child 
support rules and regulations. 
C. Welfare program rules regarding the disbursement of child support (e.g., pass-through 
policies) negatively affect the willingness of custodial parents to comply with formal 
child support rules and regulations. 
D. Welfare program rules regarding the disbursement of child support (e.g., pass-through 
policies) negatively affect the likelihood of custodial parents to comply with formal 
child support rules and regulations. 
Expectation #3 
A. Participation in covert child support agreements that positively affect the income of 
custodial parents negatively affect their willingness to comply with formal child 
support rules and regulations. 
B. Participation in covert child support agreements that positively affect the income of 
custodial parents negatively affect their likelihood to comply with formal child 








CHAPTER 3.  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
 This research is based on four related theoretical perspectives.  These perspectives are 
systems theory, family process theory, the ecology of human development, and feminist 
theory. 
Systems Theory 
 There are four basic assumptions that should be recognized when discussing systems 
theory (White & Klein, 2008).  The first assumption is that all parts of the system are 
interconnected.  The second assumption is that understanding the choices of individuals is 
only possible by viewing the whole.  That is, families are greater than just a collection of 
individuals.  The third assumption is that the behavior within a system affects its 
environment, and the environment affects the system.  This creates feedback.  The fourth 
assumption is that systems theory is not reality, but a way of knowing and understanding 
human behavior. 
Decision-making within a family is one of the main components of systems theory.  
Each decision an individual makes affects the entire family, and decisions made by the entire 
family affect each individual’s behavior.  Families are greater than just a collection of 
individuals.  Simply, the entire family has more influence than all of the individual family 
members combined.  Therefore, the family as a whole has more power than each individual 
family member (White & Klein, 2008).  For example, when a custodial parent has to decide 
whether or not to participate in a covert support relationship with the non-custodial parent in 
order to receive child support, that choice affects the family relationship, and the strength of 
the bond between the child and non-custodial parent.  The choice also affects the relationship 
27 
 
between both parents.  If a satisfactory covert support arrangement is established between 
both parents, the likelihood of involvement from the formal child support system decreases.   
Another example includes decisions made about choosing between covert support and 
working with the formal child support system.  These decisions affect the custodial parent, 
non-custodial parent, biological children, and all other members of the family.  Each decision 
the head of the household makes affects the entire family. 
 The choice to work with the formal child support system or to accept covert support 
from the non-custodial parent could be a decision made by the entire family if the custodial 
parent has a partner, and/or if the children are older.  It would be easier to explain these types 
of choices to an older child rather than a younger one.  The older child may want to have a 
relationship with the non-custodial parent, which may influence the choices made by the 
custodial parent. 
Family Process Theory 
 Kantor and Lehr (1975) also view the family as a system.  Family process theory 
characterizes the family as a self-regulating system in which each member controls each 
other’s access to meaning, power, and affect (White & Klein, 2008).  This concept helps us 
understand that the choices made by one family member affect all other family members.   
Family relationships function in an interdependent manner.  According to Kantor and 
Lehr (1975), a central theme within family systems is a focus on family strategies.  A family 
strategy is defined as a “purposive pattern of moves toward a target or goal made by two or 
more people who are systematically bound in a social-biological arrangement” (p. 18).  For 
example, when a custodial parent receives any type of financial support from the non-
custodial parent, a choice is made by the custodial parent whether to deposit the money in a 
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checking and/or savings account, pay bills, spend the money on frivolous purchases, or spend 
the money on basic living needs.  Will the money go directly to the child’s basic necessities, 
or will it be used to decrease family debt?  The child will be affected by this parental choice, 
and the parents will also be affected by the choice they make.   
Kantor and Lehr (1975), among others, have characterized the family as a goal-
seeking system.  Much of the family process maintains the social relationships within the 
family, and between the family and the environment.  Within the family, social relationships 
must be maintained as much as possible so that family members are not negatively affected 
by each other’s demands, but are still linked to each other in a bonding relationship (White & 
Klein, 2008).  A bonding relationship could be considered one of respect, non-judgment, and 
clear boundaries.  The relations between family and environment are created by transactions 
that connect the family to external systems, like the welfare and child support enforcement 
systems, while maintaining the strong boundaries of the family system (White & Klein, 
2008).   
Ecology of Human Development 
Another theory that can be used to analyze the family environment is the ecology of 
human development.  The ecology of human development is defined as the scientific study of 
the “progressive, mutual accommodation between an active, growing human being and the 
changing properties of the immediate settings in which the developing person lives, as this 
process is affected by relations between these settings, and by the larger contexts in which 
the settings are embedded” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 21).  It allows one to see how external 
factors affect the family unit.  This theory can be used, for example, to analyze changes 
within the family as a result of receiving formal, informal, or covert child support.  It allows 
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researchers to look not only at individual attributes, but also at the political, cultural, and 
historical environment in which the family lives.  By recognizing these influences, it might 
become easier for policymakers to understand the effects that governmental policies and 
programs have on families.   
A family’s environment is comprised of interpersonal relationships, which are 
“embedded in the larger social structures of community, society, economics, and politics” 
(Moen, Elder, Jr., & Luscher, 1996, p. 1).  Since the family unit is considered as a part of the 
larger social structure, there will be external influences that will affect the home environment 
the family lives in, as well as “family relationships, level and type of stress, parental concepts 
of self, and household incomes” (Wilson, Ellwood, & Brook-Gunn, 1995, p. 63).  This 
becomes evident when the custodial parent receives covert child support, which is significant 
for both the parent and the children.     
 The basic structures within the ecology of human development are the micro system, 
the meso system, the exo system, and the macro system.  The micro system is defined as a 
“pattern of activities, roles, and interpersonal relations experienced by the developing person 
in a given setting with particular physical and material characteristics” (Bronfenbrenner, 
1979, p. 22).  This system is comprised of interactions among and between family members, 
and includes the activities of the family members, each of their individual roles, the 
relationships with others, and continuous social networks.  The main factor in the micro 
system is experience and how the family member within the specific environment perceives 
the experience. 
 The meso system is defined as the “interrelations among two or more settings in 
which the family member actually participates” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 25).  This system 
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includes social networks with formal and informal communications.  Custodial parents who 
are receiving welfare benefits are in the meso system.  They would also be involved in two or 
more micro systems based on their actions.  For example, in the meso system, the decisions 
that welfare participants make regarding the way they use their public assistance, how the 
amount of their public assistance influences the amount of their child support, and whether or 
not they receive covert child support or engage in covert non-compliance, will affect 
themselves and their families.  They are active in their family’s experiences, while trying to 
maintain head of household status.  Custodial parents are also trying to make sure that their 
children cared for, both financially and emotionally.  They are establishing themselves in the 
areas of education, employment, and job training.  The children of custodial parents are also 
involved in at least two micro systems.  For example, they are involved in their family and 
their childcare experience, whether that is in an informal or formal setting. 
 The exo system is defined as “one or more settings that do not involve the developing 
person as an active participant, but in which events occur that affect, or are affected by, what 
happens in the setting containing the developing person” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 25).  The 
exo system includes sets of meso systems, which include the micro systems.  For example, a 
custodial parent’s employment and/or educational settings are considered exo systems in 
which the children do not have an active role.  However, the events that take place in the 
employment and/or educational settings affect the child, and the decisions that are made 
within the family affect the employment and/or educational settings. 
 The macro system is defined as “constituencies, in the form and content of the lower-
order systems (micro-, meso-, and exo-) that exist, or could exist, at the level of the 
subculture or the culture as a whole with any belief systems or ideology underlying such 
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constituencies” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 26).  The macro system includes all the other 
systems and their specific parts, with each affecting the other in certain ways.  The societal 
and political culture (macro system) includes the policies and governmental programs with 
which custodial parents who receive child support have to comply.  These policies and 
governmental programs also guide and regulate the micro, meso, and exo systems.  The rules, 
regulations, and policies behind welfare reform and child support would be considered a 
political event (macro) that has changed the family (micro), the family’s social networks and 
how much they are involved in actual policy making (meso), and has affected the children of 
welfare recipients by the choices that are made regarding employment and/or education.  
Figure 1 (page 39) illustrates how these systems work together and how each affects the 
others.  
Feminist Theory 
 Feminism is defined as “a social movement whose basic goal is equality between men 
and women” (Lorber, 2010, p. 1).  The goal of feminism as a political movement is to make 
women and men more equal legally, socially, and culturally (Lorber, 2010).  When thinking 
about the effects that welfare and child support policies have on low-income women, these 
policies could be seen as economically and emotionally oppressive for women and their 
children.  Marxist feminist theory, feminist standpoint theory, and liberal feminism will be 
used to analyze the experiences of the respondents from a gender, race, and socioeconomic 
perspective. 
Marxist Feminist Theory 
In Marxist feminist theory, class oppression is seen as the main way that women are 
disenfranchised and denigrated within our society.  According to Margaret Benston, the 
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importance of the exchange value of labor was emphasized in the early Marxist feminist 
tradition (Ollenburger & Moore, 1998).  Exchange value is defined as “the value of work” 
(Ollenburger & Moore, 1998, p. 20).  Exchange value has a specific emphasis when 
discussing the unpaid labor that women perform within the family, including reproduction, 
childcare, and household labor (Ollenburger & Moore, 1998).  When most women who are 
of a lower socioeconomic status reproduce, especially women of color, they are 
automatically stereotyped as “welfare mothers” who are going to live off taxpayer money.  
Actually though, most women who receive welfare benefits, regardless of race, need 
temporary assistance while they attempt to become self-sufficient and learn new skills that 
will help them become contributing members of society. 
According to Marxist feminism, women’s jobs are low paying and usually not long-
term.  Lorber (2010) states that, according to capitalist intent, “husbands supposedly are paid 
enough to maintain their families and themselves; they are supposed to get what is called a 
family wage” (p. 55). However, women head single-parent families and receive welfare 
assistance are forced into several roles within the family—mother and father, nurturer and 
provider. When these women are forced to rely on government assistance because they do 
not have husbands, they are stereotyped as “welfare queens” who are purposely living off the 
government. However, what society does not realize is that the low monetary level of welfare 
assistance is one of the reasons why families find it difficult to break the cycle of poverty.   
For example, in Iowa, a single-parent family with one child receives $361 per month 
in FIP assistance, otherwise known as the Family Investment Program (R. Thompson, 
personal communication, January 9, 2009).  Even if a family is also receiving other benefits, 
including Section 8 housing, food stamps, and childcare assistance, $361 per month is not 
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enough to make ends meet for most families.  Single-parent families on public assistance 
deal with the stigma of receiving these government benefits, and balancing the roles of 
“nurturer” and “provider” within the family.  Sometimes they cannot find employment that 
will cover all of their family’s basic living expenses.  So they are forced to accept welfare 
benefits so they can just make ends meet.   
To receive childcare assistance in the state of Iowa, the custodial parent is required to 
enroll in the Promise Jobs program (R. Thompson, personal communication, January 9, 
2009). The other requirement is making a certain number of job contacts each week in order 
to stay eligible for welfare benefits. This can become problematic for families when they 
have to contend with long waiting lists at childcare facilities, or have difficulty finding an in-
home childcare provider. Therefore, when a single mother is forced into the provider role 
because of nonpayment of child support, she may still have to be the nurturer for the family. 
 Lorber (2010) also states that Marxist feminism maintains that women are 
subordinated as a class by beliefs in stereotypes and by a patriarchal society that does not 
value women’s work in and out of the home.  Low-income women who head single-parent 
families feel this the most.  
Low-income women also do not have the same marriage options as middle- and 
upper-class women.  Most of the women involved in the studies cited throughout the 
literature review have had children with men who are also of the same socioeconomic status 
(Edin, 1995; Edin & Lein, 1997; Waller & Plotnick, 2001).  Therefore, regarding providing 
any type of child support, the father often is not making enough money to support himself 
and his child.   
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 The ongoing feminization of poverty can also help account for the socioeconomic 
status of women who are receiving welfare benefits.  This concept is defined as the “specific 
economic vulnerability of women who are the sole support of themselves and/or their 
children” (Ollenburger & Moore, 1998, p. 100).  This concept can also describe the different 
levels of socioeconomic status that women may face throughout their life cycle.  When 
discussing poverty, Ollenburger and Moore (1998) define it as “the absence of enough 
economic resources to secure life’s necessities, including food, shelter and clothing” (p. 100).  
Policymakers and others who talk about “welfare queens” draining the system are ignoring 
the overall experiences of the women and children who are living in poverty.   
During the mid-1970s, there was a widespread belief in our society that the federal 
welfare entitlement perpetuated laziness and promiscuity.  According to this belief, lazy 
women, usually women of color, were having babies to get money from the government, and 
would allow their low-income boyfriends to share in the benefits.  These lazy and immoral 
adults then supposedly raised lazy and immoral children, creating a vicious cycle of 
dependency (Edin & Lein, 1997).   
The most widely known argument legitimizing this assessment came from Charles 
Murray.  In 1984, he claimed that welfare actually makes low-income families worse off 
financially.  He argued that federal welfare became too generous in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
began to reward single mothers and laziness over marriage and work (Edin & Lein, 1997).  
Hence, the creation of marriage emphasis programs within the federal government in the late 
1980s, and their reintroduction from 2000-2008 within the Bush administration. 
On January 2, 2003, the federal government awarded over $2.2 million in grant 
money to 12 states.  This money, appropriated under the Office of Child Support 
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Enforcement, was earmarked to help single mother recover child support to help them raise 
their children.  However, the money was being used, in part, to fund marriage promotion 
programs that had nothing to do with child support recovery.  For example, the Marriage 
Coalition in Cleveland Heights, Ohio received a grant for $199,994 to pilot a “curriculum” 
targeted at low-income single parents of infants that emphasized the value of marriage.  In 
Allenstown, Pennsylvania, a grant of $177,373 was awarded to a community service group to 
work with local churches to provide marriage education for unwed couples (NOW Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, 2006).   
Feminist Standpoint Theory 
The primary concept of standpoint feminism is that knowledge must be produced 
from the point of view of a woman as well as a man.  Furthermore, the main focus of 
standpoint theory is viewing the world from where the woman is located physically, 
mentally, emotionally, and socially (Lorber, 2010).  Women’s voices need to be heard in 
order for their values and accomplishments to become visible within the dominant society.  
According to sociologist Dorothy Smith, “racially and economically privileged men are [the 
people] most likely to be in positions of power” (Sprague, 2005, p. 44).  Women who come 
from low socioeconomic backgrounds, like welfare mothers who are also custodial parents, 
are relegated to positions of second-class citizens, and are forced to follow the rules and 
regulations of the welfare and child support systems even if they find them unfair.  Their 
voices are not being heard because of their low status.  Often, their concerns about the 
systems are not seen as valid or worthwhile, and nothing changes.  They are not invited to or 
involved in the decision making process.  Decisions are being made that will effect their 
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families, and welfare mothers are rarely asked for their opinions or suggestions.  Their voices 
need to be part of the solution, not just seen as part of the problem.   
 From a racial context, Patricia Hill Collins argues that African-American women 
share the experience of oppression, and must have an interest in struggling against it 
(Sprague, 2005).  This activism has created a relationship with dominant groups, such as 
policymakers and representatives within the welfare and child support systems.  However, 
most African-American women are still marginalized and are seen as mere outsiders or 
stereotypical “welfare queens.”  Collins also explains the process of “epistemological 
gatekeeping,” which is “influenced by the standpoint of the existing community of experts 
(policymakers and administrators) applying their standards of credibility, and also by the way 
the larger culture defines certain groups as more credible than others” (Collins, 2000, p. 203). 
For example, PRWORA created a cash welfare block grant entitled Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  Its purpose was to increase state flexibility in 
providing assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for at home; end the 
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, 
and marriage; prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and 
encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1996).  Through this legislation, the values of the policymakers and 
stakeholders, mostly white, middle-aged, and economically privileged men, were forced onto 
the welfare recipients, making it seem as if the government knows what is best for the 
people.  It is not conducive to promote marriage, two-parent families, and the end to out-of-
wedlock pregnancies if there are no programs established to deal with the various types of 
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families that receive welfare benefits.  Not all cases are the same, and having these “cookie-
cutter” programs is not beneficial. 
Liberal Feminism 
 Liberal feminism claims that gender differences are not based in biology, and that 
women and men are not all that different.  If women and men are not that different, then they 
should not be treated differently under the law or in public policy (Lorber, 2010).  Liberal 
feminism also helps explain the issue of low-income families and nonpayment of child 
support. As discussed before, there are certain eligibility requirements that welfare recipients 
must face if they want to receive childcare assistance.  
 According to Lorber (2010), one of the tenets of liberal feminism is to “encourage 
employers and governments to provide workplace child care and paid parental leave” (p. 26). 
These would be beneficial programs for women who are of a higher socioeconomic status. 
However, low-income women who work in minimum wage jobs may not be able to take 
advantage of these benefits.  If these benefits are to truly enhance the quality of life for 
women of all socioeconomic statuses, then there needs to be advocacy about raising the 
minimum wage yet again.  
 Mainstreaming gender is also a tenet of liberal feminism. Lorber (2010) defines this 
concept as “ensuring that government laws or organizational policies do not adversely affect 
women and do address women’s needs” (p. 26).  Several government programs have been 
created to help welfare families break the cycle of poverty. However, the many eligibility 
requirements and “red-tape” procedures cause some families to see obtaining welfare 
benefits as being more trouble than they are worth. When it comes to single-parent families 
trying to collect child support, there are several rules and regulations that welfare families 
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must follow to establish a child support order, let alone collect money owed to their children. 
If the non-custodial parent, who in most situations is the father, is of a lower socioeconomic 
status himself, often there is no recourse on which the mother can rely to receive child 
support since the father may not have enough sustainable income if his wages are garnished. 
Nevertheless, women who are forced to rely on public assistance are seen as “welfare 
queens” regardless of their situation.  When they attempt to work, they are seen as not 
following their ascribed gender role of the nurturing mother who is the sole caretaker of her 
children.  This places her in a “no-win” dilemma. 
 In conclusion, Lorber (2010) states that within liberal feminist theory, “women and 
men should be treated in a gender-neutral manner, especially under the law” (p. 41). This 
does not seem to be the norm in the case of the nonpayment of child support. Single parents, 
mostly mothers, are held accountable when they apply for welfare benefits by being required 
to establish a child support order in order to collect support for their children. However, their 
children may not benefit from that support as long as their parent is receiving welfare 
benefits.  Non-custodial parents, mostly fathers, are also held accountable by being pressured 
to satisfy a child support obligation by any means possible.  Collins stresses that there needs 
to be a sense of community if any changes are going to be made within the welfare and child 
support systems.  All voices need to be heard and respected, including those who are 
experiencing the problems of poverty within these systems.  As Collins argues, “everyone 
must listen and respond to other voices in order to be allowed to remain in the community” 
(Collins, 2000, p. 236-237).  Only then will effective reforms become possible. 
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Linkages among perspectives 
There are similarities between the ecology of human development, systems theory, 
family process theory, and feminist theory.  The main similarity is the interconnectedness of 
the family, and how each action taken by a family member affects all other family members.  
Not taking action also plays a part within the family.  If no action is taken by a family 
member, then all other family members may suffer negative consequences.  For example, the 
family may experience an increase in family debt or the basic needs of the child may not be 
met because there is no child support coming from the non-custodial parent.  Within feminist 
theory, the levels of gender equality between men and women may be altered due to the 
choices that the parents make regarding the payment and receipt of child support.  Figure 1 
illustrates how the systems fit together within the ecology of human development and how 
each part affects the others. 
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CHAPTER 4.  MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
 To address the research questions posed in Chapter 3, feminist methodology and 
qualitative methods were used to interview stakeholders in Iowa about child support and 
welfare.  Bloom (1998) defines feminist methodology as having “a more interpersonal and 
reciprocal relationship between researchers and those whose lives are the focus of the 
research” (p. 1). 
The goal in using feminist methodology was to create a relationship with my 
respondents as one who desires information on how the child support and welfare system can 
be improved for both clients and administrators.  I wanted interviews to feel more like 
conversations, where I was learning from an insider perspective and gaining insight into the 
lives of my respondents.  The qualitative methods used included in-depth interviewing and 
analyzing historical documents such as seminal pieces of welfare and child support 
legislation (Sprague, 2000).  These qualitative methods emphasize interpretation and seek a 
detailed analysis of meaning (Sprague, 2000).   
Sample 
A convenience sample was used in the research.  A convenience sample is selected in 
such a manner that convenience and expediency are the main considerations in selecting 
respondents.  Usually, the most easily accessible respondents are used in the study (Sahai & 
Khurshid, 2002).  Respondents were recruited from organizations such as Mid-Iowa 
Community Action (MICA), Beyond Welfare, Iowa State University, and the Iowa 
Department of Human Services.  Posters were displayed on the Iowa State University 
campus and around the Ames, Iowa community, and the study was also publicized through 
various electronic means such as Facebook and various listservs.  I collected names and 
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contact information of interested parties, and then scheduled times to interview them at their 
convenience.  Participant recruitment took place in January-February 2009. 
The population of interest was placed into two categories: (1) custodial and non-
custodial parents who were current or former participants in the child support and/or welfare 
systems; and (2) administrators in the Iowa Department of Human Services, the Iowa Child 
Support Recovery Unit, and the legal system who had direct contact with custodial and non-
custodial parents in the above situations, and also had a working knowledge of the above 
systems.  Seven respondents were females who had current or past involvement with the state 
welfare and child support system in some capacity.  Two respondents were males who were 
currently paying child support.  Two respondents were DHS administrators and one 
respondent was a Polk County, Iowa judge.  A copy of Iowa State University Institutional 
Review Board approval can be found in Appendix A. 
Instrument 
As I wrote my interview questions, I analyzed government documents such as 
information from the Iowa Child Support Recovery Unit pertaining to welfare and child 
support (Iowa Department of Human Services, 2006) and the 2008 Green Book of Federal 
Child Support Rules and Regulations (U.S. House of Representatives, 2008).  This 
knowledge helped me compose questions that allowed me to understand how state legislation 
concerning welfare and child support affected custodial and non-custodial parents’ 
understanding of their options and their willingness, or lack thereof, to cooperate with these 
formal systems.  Because of this intentionality, the interview questions focused on the 
involvement of custodial and non-custodial parents in the formal state child support 
enforcement system and in covert child support arrangements.  Of particular interest were the 
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effects, if any, that welfare program rules regarding the receipt and disbursement of child 
support have on the behavior of both custodial and non-custodial parents. 
Approximately 25 questions were asked of each respondent.  The questions included 
demographic information; whether or not respondents participated in covert non-compliance, 
covert support, and/or informal support; and their general experiences with the welfare 
and/or child support systems.  All of the respondents were asked about their knowledge and 
understanding of welfare and child support regulations.  According to Waller and Plotnick 
(2001), most of the fathers they studied believed that the courts should not intervene in 
family matters.  Fathers also resented the child support system for “preventing” them from 
dramatizing their love and responsibility to their children.  For example, in some 
communities, informal support (diapers, clothing, gifts, etc.) are seen as visible symbols of 
responsible fatherhood.  For the mothers studied, some of them felt that if the state was only 
going to pass-through $50 in child support, it was not worth being involved in the formal 
system.  They thought that they would be able to receive more assistance through informal 
support.   
The interview questions posed to Iowa Department of Human Services administrators 
and judges focused on their knowledge of the child support and welfare systems.  Questions 
were included about the extent of covert support and non-covert compliance they perceived 
that occurs in Iowa, their personal feelings about the current pass-through and disregard 
policies in Iowa , and what they would like to see changed, if anything, within the current 




During the in-depth interviews, the respondents were encouraged to reflect on their 
experiences with the welfare and/or child support systems, and how those experiences had an 
impact, if any, on their life choices.  Learning the history of both of these systems and the 
legislation that influenced them also gave me a context in which to analyze my respondents’ 
responses.   
Twelve interviews were completed.  I was unsuccessful in soliciting any interviews 
from Child Support Recovery Unit officials in Des Moines.  They felt that they had nothing 
of substance to share with me, and also expressed confidentiality concerns.  The interviews 
were conducted at an Iowa DHS office, on the Iowa State University campus, and in private 
residences.  The interviews ranged from 14 minutes to 49 minutes, and were tape-recorded.  
An advertisement was placed on the Iowa State University job board, and chose three 
university students were chosen as transcriptionists for my interviews.  Pseudonyms were 
used in all written material to protect respondent anonymity.  Each respondent received a 
copy of the results, discussion, conclusion, and recommendations of this thesis in order to 
ensure that their thoughts were interpreted correctly, and that nothing they expressed was 
taken out of context.  They did not request any changes. 
Interview Protocol and Data Analysis 
“…what you already know is as important as what you want to know.  What you want 
to know determines which questions you will ask.  What you already know  
will determine how you ask them” (Leech, 2002, p. 665). 
 
A semi-structured interview guide was created, and open- and closed-ended questions 
were asked to provide respondents with the greatest opportunity to explore their own 
experiences.  To organize questions and help the interviews flow as naturally as possible, 
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questions were thematically grouped into three sections: questions about background 
information, questions about the range of the respondents’ experiences with welfare policies, 
and concluding questions that specifically explored child support issues.   
After the transcriptionists returned the interviews, open coding was used to create a 
set of descriptive codes for the interview data.  Open coding is a method by which the 
researcher creates a detailed descriptive note for each distinctive comment in the transcript 
margins (Esterberg, 2002).  Once the transcripts were coded, patterns and common themes 
were identified in the respondents' stories.  Notations and descriptive notes were used to 
write chapter five of this thesis.  The multi-page document will be destroyed with the 



























CHAPTER 5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The child support and welfare systems can be difficult to navigate for clients, 
administrators, and policymakers.  There are many rules and regulations to remember and 
follow.  When one forgets or does not follow a rule, welfare benefits can be decreased or 
even eliminated.   
The sample was a very diverse group.  The respondents who were current or former 
clients within the welfare and/or child support systems ranged from 21-37 years.  The ages of 
their children ranged from 2 ½-21 years.  The average length that the respondents had been 
receiving welfare benefits was 2.25 years.  Most respondents had only one child support 
order, although two respondents were involved in two separate orders.  The child support 
orders discussed in the interviews had been established between 1994-2007, and support 
amounts ranged from $52-$614 per month.  Ginger, a single mother of three children, is 
involved in two separate child support orders.  Each order had explicit instructions that both 
the non-custodial parents would pay for health care for the children involved.  That has never 
occurred.  She has always paid the medical expenses for both of these children.  There were 
very few modifications made to the child support orders discussed.  Non-custodial parents 
satisfied between $50-$3400 of their total child support orders, with two of the non-custodial 
parents being approximately $35,000 and $9000 behind on their child support obligations, 
respectively.  The two male respondents in my research, Tom and Rick, were paying between 
$143-$300 per month to satisfy their child support orders. 
When asked about their experiences with the state child support and welfare systems, 
most of my respondents reported they had negative experiences.  Dana, a single mother of 
two daughters, had been raped by her youngest child’s father.  She was told by DHS to either 
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establish paternity or risk losing state-provided medical insurance (a.k.a. Title 19) for both 
herself and her children.  Currently, there is a court order to establish paternity in this case, 
but nothing has happened.  Tom felt that the amount of his child support obligation was too 
high in comparison to his low wages.  He reported that CSRU kept him informed about 
where to send advance payments, etc., but also took both his 2008 state and federal tax 
refunds to satisfy his child support arrearages.  Although, the total of both tax refunds was 
approximately $2000 more than what he owed the state of Iowa.  As of February 2009, he 
has still not received the rest of his tax refund. 
Ginger has been involved with the state child support system for 15 years.  Her oldest 
son’s father owes approximately $35,000 in child support arrearages.  She has taken him to 
court on numerous occasions for being paid in cash “under the table.”  His brother, the owner 
of a local business, has at times proved paperwork stating that the non-custodial parent is 
“learning a trade,” and has not received payment for his services.  Ginger has provided 
CSRU with photographs of where her oldest son’s father works, business cards and pens with 
his name on them, photographs of him actually working, etc., and he still is not paying his 
child support on a consistent basis.  According to Ginger, the only sanctions that he has ever 
received were one day in jail and losing his driver’s license for approximately four months.  
However, he drove the entire time his license was revoked.  One reason this was possible was 
that he does not have any vehicles registered in his name.   
Ginger had an ironic experience with her case.  Approximately six years ago, her 
oldest son’s father sent a payment of $72.44 to CSRU to be credited to his son’s account.  
The next day, he contacted CSRU and wanted them to switch the payment to his oldest 
daughter’s account.  CSRU switched the payment and sent Ginger a bill for $72.44.  She has 
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been receiving the same bill for the past six years, and has told CSRU that she will not pay 
this bill until her son’s child support obligation is paid in full.  Ginger’s oldest son’s father 
has also had several contempt of court charges placed against him for non-payment of child 
support.  He has used a variety of explanations, including the death of his father and not 
being able to pay his child support because it is such a high amount.  Ginger said that the 
amount is usually lowered, and then he makes a payment.   
Ginger’s youngest child’s father is also being paid in cash, and tells CSRU that he is 
not working.  Ironically, he is in a local commercial.  He has told Ginger that he has 
contacted CSRU on numerous occasions stating that he cannot pay his child support.  He has 
said that CSRU has given him grace periods to get caught up on his financial obligation.  He 
still owes approximately $9000 in child support arrearages. 
Dani, a single mother of a 2 ½ year old boy, felt that it was more beneficial for her to 
keep her welfare benefits than to accept the full amount of the child support order 
($521/month) because she was receiving child care assistance, transportation assistance, and 
medical assistance for herself and her son.  However, her childcare assistance ran out in 
December 2008.  If she was not going to receive additional childcare assistance, she wanted 
to receive child support:   
When my child support order was established, it was $521 and my FIP was $361.  My 
DHS worker said that if I took the child support, I would not be able to get child care 
assistance.  My childcare was $721, so I sure am going with the program that will 
pay for that.  At one point, my DHS worker said that my child support was high and 
more beneficial than my FIP.  I wanted to switch to just getting child support.  I was 
off FIP for about an hour.  My DHS worker didn’t realize that if I was on child 
support, I would lose my health insurance.  I couldn’t afford that because I see a 
therapist 3 times a month, am on 3 different medicines, and go to the dentist every 6 
months.  I like my child support, but I am not willing to be without health insurance.   
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Dani had to make a choice as to what assistance would be most financially beneficial 
to help raise her son: child support or welfare.  There was some perceived confusion on the 
part of the DHS workers as to the rules regarding child support and the status of Dani’s 
health insurance.  If Dani had had the correct information from the beginning, she may have 
made a different choice. 
Some of my respondents did not have any specific experiences, positive or negative, 
with either system.  Alice, a single mother of a three-year-old boy stated: 
“When I graduate, I don’t plan on ever going back on FIP.  Once I graduate, it’s my  
job to provide for my child.  But, right now, I need help.” 
 
Theresa, a mother of a 15-year-old girl, stated: 
  
I mostly just did my thing, and whatever happened, happened.  I didn’t really get too 
involved.  When I was on FIP, it wasn’t that much anyway, so it didn’t make too much 
of a difference.  I wasn’t using the child support right away.  I was saving it for my 
daughter’s college.  I did not want to cause a hassle.  I did report to CSRU when he 
graduated from college. 
 
There was much discussion by respondents regarding what they perceived as the 
strengths and weaknesses of the state child support and welfare systems.  The first comment 
was gratitude that welfare funding was available at all.  Most people who receive welfare 
benefits are also receiving housing, food, and other assistance from various agencies.  Non-
profit organizations work in tandem with state agencies to help low-income people meet 
their basic needs.   
Some of the respondents felt that DHS and CSRU have good intentions. As Tom 
commented, “They are trying to make both parents raise a child.”  However, it may not 
come across that way through their rules and regulations. 
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Dana discussed her frustration with welfare rules regarding employment.  To receive 
FIP, one must enroll in a program entitled Promise Jobs.  The intent of this program is to 
help low-income individuals learn job skills and obtain employment.  One of the 
requirements of this program is to complete 30 hours of job searching a week in order to 
stay eligible for FIP.  Dana felt that this is asking too much.  She was having a difficult time 
completing this requirement because she needed to find childcare for her daughters, and 
then find transportation to fill out applications.  There was also a requirement through 
Promise Jobs of attending a week of job training in Des Moines.  Dana replied: 
“How am I going to get there with having to pay for child care and no job?  You 
can’t get child care without having a job.” 
 
With our current economy, several people are typically applying for the same 
positions.  Therefore, it is extremely difficult to establish new job contacts each week.  Dana 
also commented on the intrusiveness of CSRU during paternity establishment.  She was 
frustrated that she was asked questions about her sexual partners when filling out the form to 
establish paternity.  She did not feel it was necessary for CSRU to know about every person 
she had been involved with on a sexual basis.  However, she felt forced to give this 
information in order to maintain her welfare benefits.   
Another concern came from Anne, a single mother of a seven-year-old boy.  She was 
frustrated when she could not get her son’s father’s health insurance card.  She found it 
difficult to get assistance from health care providers if she did not have an actual insurance 
card to help identify who paid what percentage of the child’s health care costs. 
Ginger discussed her difficulties with CSRU in trying to locate the fathers of her 
children so that they could be forced to pay their child support.  She called CSRU several 
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times about both men, giving CSRU information on how to locate them, but nothing 
happened.  She stated: 
“You’re just another number to them.  I don’t feel like they’re working for me as 
much as they possibly could.” 
 
Theresa reflected back on her experiences with the state welfare system: 
 
 The whole system is very insulting.  The whole process is very patronizing.  There is 
so much paperwork that needs to be filled out every single month, and you are 
penalized if you miss something.  When you are working, going to school, and taking 
care of your kids… It is so much extra stuff with so many strict deadlines.  I felt like it 
was very paternalistic.  It just makes you feel small. 
 
 The next topic discussed with the respondents was whether or not they participated in 
covert support, covert non-compliance, and/or informal support.  There was very little 
admission of covert support and covert non-compliance.  Dana admitted that from June-
December of 2007, her youngest daughter’s father paid the $20 co-pay for her childcare even 
though it was already factored into her welfare benefits.  She did not feel like it was very 
important because she would help him out with gas so he could go to work in order to pay his 
child support.  To her, it all balanced out.  When it came to participation in covert non-
compliance, all but one of the respondents stated that they followed the rules and regulations 
as they pertained to welfare and child support.  Tom always followed the rules, stating: 
“I would rather not go against the government.  It’s more of a situation where I’d 
rather show that I was always being cooperative than to not be cooperating and have 
them do financial harm to me just for the sake of not cooperating.” 
 
Theresa felt the same way: 
 
“I’ve never not cooperated, and the reason why not is because I don’t have any 
reason not to.  I mean, they’re collecting money for me, so I don’t have any reason to 
not cooperate with them.” 
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Most of the respondents were involved in some sort of informal support.  Most of it 
was in the form of clothing and holiday presents.  This reflects what Grall (2007) found.  The 
Polk County judge stated: 
It is not unusual for a defendant in a criminal case to say that he has no formal 
support order, but is providing some type of support to the child or children.  This 
information comes out in the pre-sentence investigation report.  There are support 
establishment cases where it is apparent that the father is providing at least some 
type of support to children on FIP. 
 
An Iowa DHS administrator shared the same perspective: 
 
I think informal child support goes on frequently.  You have two parents and their 
common goal is to raise a child.  I think to some extent the level of informal support is 
directly related to the relationship these parents have.  There are a variety of 
relationships.  So, I think the level of informal support is often times directly related 
to the relationship between the parents.  I do think there should be a direct interest in 
the welfare of the child, so I do think there is a fair amount of informal support. 
 
Covert support was another issue.  Throughout both my interviews with DHS 
administrators and the Polk County judge, covert support was deemed more difficult to 
establish and track than informal support.  None of the administrators nor the judge could 
give me any specific percentages of the current child support or welfare cases that involved 
covert or informal support.  However, according to an Iowa DHS administrator: 
We have run across cases where we discover that an absent parent who is living out 
of state is paying some child support to the parent with the child that is receiving FIP.  
They are often times not putting it on the application and reporting it to their worker.  
It’s clearly communicated that if you are receiving FIP, you need to let us know about 
your child support order.  I think the amount of that has decreased over the years 
because of technology.  Also, the communication between states and child support 
recovery agencies has gotten better.  Often times, families do not report something 
they are supposed to report.  It may work for a while, but if you do it too many times, 
we have a way of finding them.  When we do find them, their benefit levels are either 
reduced or cut.   
 
You have a father or absent parent paying cash.  The parents have their own cash 
arrangement.  I think that this has lessened because CSRU has gotten much more 
aggressive in their pursuit of absent parents.  They have more abilities to track down 
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absent parents and garnish wages, etc.  These balances are forever.  I tell absent 
parents, “You do not want to participate in a covert child support arrangement 
because the state of Iowa will be coming after you.”  As soon as they start to discover 
that the state is going to hold them responsible for repayment of FIP benefits, they 
are all of a sudden very interested in getting credit for the money paid.  On the other 
hand, I let them know that this is still your child and if you see there are needs for 
that child, you are still a parent and that would go back to informal support.  To me, 
part of that is just being a responsible parent.  If you have any contact with that child 
at all, I feel like you have some obligation to provide for material needs for that kid. 
  
The issue of gender discussed with the male respondents.  The specific question was 
whether or not they felt they were treated differently within the systems because they were 
male.  Tom felt that as a male, he was at a disadvantage.  He felt that there was a stipulation 
of a big and unfair distinction between the father’s willingness to care for the child and the 
mother’s ability to care for the child.  He also felt disadvantaged in the legal and systemic 
sense: 
When we broke up, my daughter stayed with me.  The police said that she needed to 
go to her mother, or, if I protested, she would go to a foster home.  If the roles were 
reversed, they wouldn’t let the father walk out with the kid.  They would say she needs 
to stay at home.  What sense would it make to send the child to live with the less 
stable parent?  They gave her physical custody because she already had her.  I want 
physical custody, not to duck a bill, but because I want my daughter to be here.  I 
want to support her.  I have to fight harder to prove that I’m at least equal, whereas 
she can be less stable and not fight so hard and be better.  She can make decisions 
because she has physical care and there is nothing I can do about it.  I don’t feel like 
my lawyer thought to give me physical custody.  If I were the mother and she were the 
father, there would have been more fighting without me having to light a fire under 
someone to get them to move. 
 
Whenever the mother is in trouble or needs some help, it’s like you can do whatever 
you want because you don’t have her.  If you are having trouble, let me have her.  It’s 
like no—you can’t.  The other one wants what the other one has.  She wants to have 
more freedoms or she doesn’t like me because I have the freedoms to act more like a 
single parent, and she has to be more parent than single.  I think the way the system is 
set up, it kind of looks to the mother to do that without an evaluation to show stability.  
The system is set up to do something, but it’s not working on the principles of putting 
the child first. 
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When it came to understanding FIP policies as they pertained to child support 
payment and receipt, most of the respondents evidently understood these policies.  They may 
not have seen them as fair or equitable at times, but they nevertheless followed them for the 
most part.  Dana had an interesting perspective about following the rules: 
“The only reason I know about the different loopholes and technicalities is that in 
some way, shape, or form, I have broken them, and when I break them, I learn.  I 
have to break a rule to figure it out.” 
 
One of the Iowa DHS administrators had a different perspective: 
It varies from household to household.  The exposure to our programs and the quality 
of an explanation from a worker that family may or may not have received in the past 
seems to directly relate to these two things.  Some of our families want their FIP now 
because “I am in crisis.”  Their mind is not open to listening to a lot of other things.  
Often times, they think they are in compliance until they receive a non-cooperating 
sanction and even then they aren’t worried about it until the benefits run out and then 
they are back for more.  What do I need to do?  I think if you see a history of non-
cooperation notices, you have somebody who either does not understand the 
proceedings and practices of child support in our department, in our relationship, or 
they are just not very compliant because they are not organized, educated, etc.  
Maybe the paperwork is challenging to them.  I think sometimes if you see some of 
these people receiving consistent non-cooperation notices, that might also be an 
indication that you may have some covert support. 
  
The Polk County judge was asked about the equity of child support policies as they 
pertain to FIP recipients.  She discussed how in the case of joint physical care, each parent 
legally owes the other the full amount of support as if the other parent had primary care of 
the children.  These support amounts are offset against each other, and the parent owing the 
higher amount pays the difference to the other parent.  This recognizes that each parent has 
the costs of providing a home for the children.  If one parent receives FIP, the state takes the 
full support amount owed by the other parent.  Thus, the non-FIP parent has to pay the state a 
much higher amount of support than he would pay the other parent in child support.  She did 
not see this as being fair to children.  Unfortunately, she did not elaborate on this point. 
54 
 
The respondents had plenty of ideas about changes that should be made to the current 
state welfare and child support systems.  Both Tom and Dani felt that welfare benefits and 
child support should not be tied together.  Tom thought that FIP benefits should be calculated 
to exclude child support.  Dani stated: 
I feel like child support and FIP should be separate things.  I just feel like child 
support is not income, and shouldn’t count as income.  I wouldn’t use my child 
support for my own personal things.  I would use it to pay for day care and buy my 
child stuff.  If there was extra, it would go in his savings account.  Child support is for 
my child.  So, I don’t know how it could count for my own income.  That is the 
purpose of child support—to cover the expenses of the child.  I am sure there are 
countless mothers who don’t have the fathers paying anything, so they’re taking all 
my child support to make up for the people they won’t ever see child support from.  
It’s not fair, but I don’t really have a choice.  I felt that if FIP gives me $361 month, 
then they should take $361 out of my child support, and give me what is left over. 
 
Theresa felt frustrated about how tax laws affected child support:   
The amounts that he had to pay in child support ($50, $100, $200) do not equate to 
anything like half of what it costs to raise a child.  I thought that child support should 
be much higher to be more realistic.  I also thought the tax law was wrong.  I think 
my lawyer told me that if my daughter’s father paid more than $250/month, he would 
get to claim her as a dependent.  Here I am, the custodial parent, and paying way 
more than $250/month myself to raise this child.  I wouldn’t have been able to claim 
her daycare or health care anymore because she wasn’t my dependent.  Fortunately, 
his child support never got that high.  I think if you’re a non-custodial parent, you 
should be paying well more than half of that child’s upkeep before you should be able 
to claim a child.  Make it less paternalistic.  Be more respectful of the woman.  I 
understand there is this whole need from a politician’s perspective to be accountable 
for taxpayers’ money.  We don’t call the child tax credit welfare, we don’t call all the 
ways to get out of paying taxes welfare, we don’t call it welfare when the government 
subsidizes huge amounts for companies. For me, it’s that thing. It’s that there’s a 
stigma put on welfare, even calling it welfare, that to me isn’t any different than the 
fact that I get a huge tax break because I’m in a house now. I don’t know how that’s 
any different from being on welfare.  Because I can afford a house, I get a tax break 
and I get to be proud of it, and the poor woman who can’t afford a house gets a tax 
break and has to call it welfare and fill out a thousand forms and be asked questions 
about her personal life. That’s the biggest thing for me, not to treat it so different than 




Another question posed to the DHS administrators concerned the feasibility of either 
raising welfare benefit levels, passing through the first $50 of a child support amount to the 
custodial parent, or a combination of both.  Would either of these policies aid low-income 
families in leaving welfare?  Both of the Iowa DHS administrators stated they did not believe 
this to be the case:  
I think there are some delicate balances these policies are trying to maintain—the 
balance between providing the child support to the parents and in fairness to the tax 
payers who are ultimately paying the entire amount of FIP for recipients.  In terms of 
the $50 leading towards self-sufficiency—the FIP standard has not changed in 15 
years.  I don’t know how you can realistically think that anybody on FIP is going to 
reach self-sufficiency.  The work incentives have a better chance of moving somebody 
towards self-sufficiency through work.  Child support is not always guaranteed or 
consistent, whereas welfare benefits and other services usually are.   
 
There are too many variables to keeping someone off of welfare.  If you have child 
support and that custodial parent had a good job, the combination of those two things 
will keep them out of poverty and off of welfare.  Without that combination, that’s just 
the way of the world.  I would say that food assistance and Medicaid actually help 
more people than FIP does.  There is no way that we could ever afford to have a FIP 
grant amount that people could actually live on. 
 
In summary, the respondents involved in the research each had their own unique 
experiences in dealing with both the state child support and welfare systems.  Some felt that 
they were looked down on because they were single mothers on welfare.  Others felt that as 
long as they followed the rules, everything would be fine.  The main theme of these 
interviews was that there needs to be changes in the state welfare and child support rules to 
make them more user-friendly.  Some of the respondents felt like “numbers” within the 
systems, and did not feel like anyone was working for them.  This, in part, could be due to 
the fact that both of these systems are underfunded and the employees are overworked and 
underpaid.  One possible solution would be to require workers to provide more education to 
low-income families about welfare and child support rules and regulations.  Another solution 
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would be to hire more child support enforcement and income maintenance workers.  
However, in our current economic situation, this is not feasible.  More federal funding would 
help. 
 This research focused on the involvement of custodial parents in the formal state 
child support enforcement and welfare systems and their potential covert child support 
arrangements.  Of particular interest were the effects welfare program rules regarding the 
receipt and disbursement of child support have on the behavior of custodial and non-
custodial parents.  According to the reflections of the respondents, most of them participate 
in informal child support arrangements, and some covert support.  When there was 
participation in a covert support arrangement, it was for a very small amount.  These covert 
arrangements do not seriously affect the income of custodial parents, nor do they have a 
significant effect on their willingness and likelihood to comply with formal child support 
rules and regulations.   
Most of the respondents do not understand the rules and regulations of the state 
welfare and child support systems at first, but make a valiant attempt to understand them by 
asking for help from the DHS workers assigned to their cases.  They understand the intent 
behind the rules, but feel that most rules are not equitable.  Most of the respondents have 
concluded that it is easier to just follow the rules and regulations, and when informal support 
arrangements are established, they can be helpful.  If they are not established, it does not 
make much of a difference.   
In comparing the results of this research with the original research expectations, it 
was determined that covert arrangements do not have a significant effect on the income of 
custodial parents who participated in them.  As mentioned before, most of the respondents 
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follow the rules and regulations of the state welfare and child support systems because they 
fear sanctions for non-compliance, and do not want to add more stress to life as a low-income 
family.  However, participation in the formal child support system also does not have a 
significant impact on income of custodial parents.  As one of the Iowa DHS administrators 
stated in his interview, some custodial parents cannot always rely on child support because of 
inconsistency of payments by the non-custodial parent.  In this situation, some parents 
engage in informal support to make up for the gaps in payments.  However, the level of 
informal support still does not make a significant impact on the income of custodial parents.  
Welfare program rules regarding the receipt and disbursement of child support sometimes 
frustrate the respondents, but they still feel the need to comply with them.  Not wanting to get 
caught breaking the rules and risk getting welfare benefits decreased or cut all together 
outweigh their likelihood or willingness to engage in covert behavior or covert non-
compliance.  Therefore, there is not much of a significant negative impact on their 
willingness or likelihood to comply with formal child support rules and regulations.   
The theories that were discussed earlier really help explain the lives of custodial 
parents on welfare, and how the choices made concerning child support affect relationships 
with both their children and the non-custodial parents.  Some families on welfare have a 
systematic approach to how they live their lives.  Each decision is weighed with advantages 
and disadvantages, and thought is put in to each step of the process.  Some families follow all 
the rules they have been assigned, and think of ways to best deal with these regulations.  
Other families live in the moment, and may not think about the consequences of their actions 
and how they affect others.  As mentioned by an Iowa DHS administrator in his interview, 
some families want their assistance now, and will think about the consequences later.  They 
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are always in “crisis,” and may not make the best decisions for themselves and their families.  
These are the families that are more likely to engage in informal or covert support just to 
make ends meet.  In reflecting back on Bronfenbrenner’s levels of human development, I 
want to intervene on behalf of welfare families who are making these difficult decisions and 
include their voice in discussions with policymakers and other stakeholders.  As stated 
before, low-income families need to be part of the solution, and not always seen as part of the 
problem. 
Limitations 
One should not generalize beyond this sample of respondents.  My original research 
expectations may have been met with a different sample.  For example, the area of the 
country in which my sample is located could have influenced my results.  Edin (1995) 
recruited her sample from four large cities.  Being that my sample only involved individuals 
living in the Midwest, this may have impacted why I did not find greater participation in 
covert support arrangements or covert non-compliance.  Another issue that may have 
influenced my results was the trust factor between the respondents and me.  Even though I 
personally knew five of the respondents who were current and former clients in the state 
welfare and/or child support systems, there was still a risk on their part of saying something 
that might get them in trouble with DHS or CSRU.  I promised complete confidentiality and 
anonymity, but people still want to be in control of their thoughts and how they are 
portrayed.  One way I honored that feeling was by having each respondent review the results, 
discussion, conclusion, and recommendations of the thesis to verify that I quoted them 
correctly and portrayed their responses fairly and accurately.  None of the respondents asked 
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me to make changes to their transcripts.  This is a very important concept within qualitative 
research.   
Implications for Future Research 
 Several concepts pertaining to child support and welfare policies and how they affect 
low-income families have been introduced, discussed, and analyzed throughout this thesis, 
but more can be understood.  One area that is lacking in research is whether increasing FIP 
levels would truly financially benefit welfare recipients.  Both of the Iowa DHS 
administrators I interviewed did not feel that an increase would make much of a difference in 
the lives of low-income families, but there is much to be said about the proposed 
responsibility of other government programs or non-profit organizations in helping support 
low-income families in the areas of housing, food, energy, transportation, medical, etc.  If 
FIP levels were increased, would the burden to these programs and organizations decrease?  
This is worth investigating.   
It would be extremely helpful to revisit the respondents in the Edin (1995) study to 
see if they are still participating in covert support arrangements and covert non-compliance 
behaviors.  Recruiting a new sample from these four cities (Chicago, Illinois, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, San Antonio, Texas, and Charleston, South Carolina) might be helpful to see 
if current welfare mothers are treated any differently within the welfare and child support 
systems than what occurred in the 1995 study, and if they choose the same behaviors. 
Another area of research is to analyze the benefits and disincentives of separating 
welfare benefits and child support.  That is, if a parent is receiving welfare benefits and child 
support, they would receive the full amount of each type of assistance.  In addition, if these 
two concepts became separate, would low-income families become more self-sufficient and 
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possibly be able to leave welfare?  All collected child support should go to welfare families 
and the children it is meant to support.  As shown throughout the literature review, a non-
custodial parent’s incentive to pay child support increases when he or she knows that the 
money is going directly to the child, and not the state to reimburse for the welfare costs of the 
custodial parent.   
After reflecting on the experiences that respondents had with the formal welfare and 
child support systems, I have drawn some conclusions and formulated some policy 
recommendations that could assist these systems in becoming easier to understand and 
navigate.  More client-focused policies could also be established that may be more beneficial 



























CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
I definitely have a personal bias when it comes to child support and welfare policies 
in the state of Iowa because of specific experiences that my best friend has had with these 
systems.  My perspective is that CSRU has not done all that they can to enforce my friend’s 
child support order, and that they have somewhat enabled two of the fathers of her children 
to accumulate large child support arrearages.  That is the reason why I chose child support as 
my general thesis topic.   
Even though I have a personal bias, I wanted to understand in more depth how the 
child support and welfare systems work, and what can be done to possibly enhance their 
effectiveness.  My goal was to bring the voices of the disenfranchised into the public sphere, 
and to add these voices to the discussion of proposed changes to the state welfare and child 
support systems.  I want my thesis to help effect some positive social change, not just sit on a 
shelf and collect dust. 
 In staying true to my goal of creating social change, I make the following policy 
recommendations based on this research: 
(1) I will be writing a policy brief that I can use to publicize my results and policy 
recommendations.  This brief will be disseminated to various non-profit and policy 
organizations, like MICA, Inc., Beyond Welfare, and the Child and Family Policy 
Center.  I also want to publicize the ruling by the Iowa Supreme Court regarding child 
support.  The Iowa Supreme Court adopted new child support guidelines that went 
into effect on July 1, 2009.  The news guidelines emphasize that each parent has a 
duty to support their child, support should reflect the cost of raising a child, and the 
level of support paid should be in proportion to each parent’s level of income.  The 
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guidelines also provide an adjustment for the support obligations of non-custodial 
parents whose net income falls below the federal poverty level.  This adjustment 
should help non-custodial parents satisfy their child support obligation, and still have 
enough money to cover their basic living needs (Davis, 2009).   
(2) I will also make my findings and recommendations available to the Iowa Department 
of Human Services and Child Support Recovery Unit.  My mission will be to educate 
people, both policymakers and citizens alike, on a grassroots level, and bring the 
voices of disenfranchised and impoverished Iowa families to the table.  This is the 
only way that any real dialogue can occur—bringing both parties together so 
solutions can be found and implemented.  I want to intervene on the families’ behalf 
so that they can be part of the solution, and not always seen as past of the problem. 
(3) I would like to investigate the feasibility of an educational program that would be 
user-friendly to both DHS administrators, CSRU administrators, and their clients.  In 
reflecting on my results, some of my respondents had difficulty understanding 
program rules and regulations, but made the choice to follow them so they would not 
get in trouble and possibly have their welfare benefits reduced or lose them all 
together.  An easy example would be to have a booklet that would have all of the 
child support rules and regulations as they pertain to welfare written in an easy-to-
read form.  There would be a checklist included in the booklet that the client would 
have to fill out and return to their caseworker.  At that time, the clients could ask 
questions about anything they did not understand in the booklet.  This would be more 
of a shared responsibility model.   
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(4) Another example of a policy recommendation would be to divert federal funding that 
is designated to marriage promotion programs and use it establish or maintain 
existing programming on responsible parenting, job training, and skill-building.  A 
program such as the Parental Obligation Pilot Programs in Iowa assist low-income 
non-custodial parents to address the barriers that are preventing them from satisfying 
their child support obligation.  Program participants can receive different types of 
services including parental skills training, mediation with the custodial parent, legal 
assistance and referral, financial counseling, and father support groups.  Funding for 
this program is provided by a federal welfare block grant.  However, these programs 
are currently only found in Waterloo and in Mahaska and Wapello counties (Iowa 
Department of Human Services, 2009).  
 In conclusion, it is my hope that this research will be deemed beneficial to Iowa DHS 
and CSRU administrators and policymakers in helping them to understand the struggles of 
low-income families and how they view the formal welfare and child support systems.  It is 
time for all involved parties to work together to create policies and establish programs that 
assist low-income families with their child support order, and fully maintain and financially 
support programs that are already in place, such as the Parental Obligation Pilot Projects.  























My name is Alissa Stoehr and I am a graduate student in the Interdisciplinary Graduate 
Studies program at Iowa State University.  I am currently working on completing my thesis 
entitled “Welfare policies and covert behaviors: Understanding the relationship among low-
income families receiving child support.”   
 
You are being invited to participate in this study because you have/had a current child 
support order and are/were receiving Family Investment Program (FIP) assistance through 
the state of Iowa.  Your participation in this study in no way infers that you are/were 
participating in the covert behaviors being studied. 
  
The audiotaped interview will last approximately two hours.  You will be offered a $20 gift 
card regardless of whether or not you complete the interview.  There are no foreseeable risks 
at this time from participating in this study.  All responses will remain confidential. 
 
I hope that you will agree to participate and help me better understand the current welfare 
and child support systems in the state of Iowa, and how they could be improved for everyone 
involved. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, please feel free to contact me at 


























My name is Alissa Stoehr and I am a graduate student in the Interdisciplinary Graduate 
Studies program at Iowa State University.  I am currently working on completing my thesis 
entitled “Welfare policies and covert behaviors: Understanding the relationship among low-
income families receiving child support.”   
 
You are being invited to participate in this study because you are paying child support to the 
state of Iowa since the mother of your child is receiving Family Investment Program (FIP) 
assistance.  You are considered a non-custodial parent.  Your participation in this study in no 
way infers that you are participating in the covert behaviors being studied. 
  
The audiotaped interview will last approximately two hours.  You will be offered a $20 gift 
card regardless of whether or not you complete the interview.  There are no foreseeable risks 
at this time from participating in this study.  All responses will remain confidential. 
 
I hope that you will agree to participate and help me better understand the current welfare 
and child support systems in the state of Iowa, and how they could be improved for everyone 
involved. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, please feel free to contact me at 




























My name is Alissa Stoehr and I am a graduate student in the Interdisciplinary Graduate 
Studies program at Iowa State University.  I am currently working on completing my thesis 
entitled “Welfare policies and covert behaviors: Understanding the relationship among low-
income families receiving child support.”   
 
You are being invited to participate in this study because you are employed by the 
Department of Human Services or the Child Support Recovery Unit, and may have/have had 
direct contact with clients who have/had a current child support order and are/were receiving 
Family Investment Program (FIP) assistance through the state of Iowa.  You may also be able 
to add a legal perspective to my thesis research.   
 
The audiotaped interview will last approximately two hours.  You will be offered a $20 gift 
card regardless of whether or not you complete the interview.  There are no foreseeable risks 
at this time from participating in this study.  All responses will remain confidential. 
 
I hope that you will agree to participate and help me better understand the current welfare 
and child support systems in the state of Iowa, and how they could be improved for everyone 
involved. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, please feel free to contact me at 

























INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Title of Study: Welfare policies and covert behaviors: Understanding the  
   relationship among low-income families receiving child support 
 
Investigators: Alissa Stoehr, B.L.S., B.S. and Dr. Steven Garasky, Ph.D. 
 
This is a research study.  Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate.  




The purpose of this study is to examine the effects that covert non-compliance and covert 
support have on welfare recipients who receive child support.  Covert non-compliance is 
defined as the decision by a welfare recipient to pretend to comply with the formal child 
support system, while withholding important information from child support enforcement 
workers, such as the true identity, location, and earnings of the non-custodial parent.  Covert 
support is defined as financial and/or material contributions made by non-custodial parents 
that are not reported to the formal child support system.  
 
You are being invited to participate in this study because you have/had a current child 
support order and/or are/were receiving Family Investment Program (FIP) assistance through 
the state of Iowa.  Your participation in this study in no way infers that you are/were 
participating in the covert behaviors being studied. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an audiotaped 
interview lasting approximately two hours.  During the interview, I will ask you questions 
about your current child support arrangements, your experiences with the state child support 
system, your participation in informal or covert child support arrangements, and your 
opinions about state policies related to child support.  I reserve the right to re-contact you if 
clarification is needed.  You can choose to skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
 
Each interview will be audiotaped.  The audiotape and transcript of your interview will be 
kept for one year in a locked file cabinet.  After one year, all audiotapes and paper copies of 
your interviews will be properly destroyed.  
 
I will use direct quotes in my thesis.  I will choose a pseudonym for you to use throughout 
the interview.  The interview will be held at a neutral location (eg. not at the DHS office).  
The only people present for the interview will be you, the participant, and me, the 
interviewer.  A copy of my thesis, cleared of all identifiers, will be shared with DHS and the 
Child Support Recovery Unit (CSRU) at the completion of my research.  There is no 
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reasonable possibility that you will be identifiable in my thesis since I will follow the 




There is a risk to you if your comments about participation in covert support and/or non-
covert compliance should be disclosed or overheard by Department of Human Services or 
Child Support Recovery Unit officials.  This information could potentially put you at risk of 
losing your state assistance.  To alleviate this risk as much as possible, all interviews will 
occur in a neutral and private location with only you, the participant, and I, the interviewer, 
present.  All appropriate confidentiality measures will be followed in this study, including 




While there are likely no direct benefits to you, I hope that my study will allow your voice to 
be heard as I seek to help improve the Iowa child support system for all involved.  
 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
 
You will be compensated for participating in this study with a $20 gift card regardless of 




Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or 
leave the study at any time.  If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study 
early, it will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
Your choice of whether or not to participate in this study will not have any effect on your FIP 




Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available.  However, federal 
government regulatory agencies, auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the 
Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves human subject research 
studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality assurance and data analysis.  These 
records may contain private information.   
 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be 
taken:  Each participant will be assigned a pseudonym that will be used during the 
interview(s).  The people that will have access to the data will be the researcher and major 
professor.  The data will be stored in a locked cabinet, which the only access available will 
be to the researcher.  Any data collected from this study, including audiotapes and transcripts 
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will be kept until October 1, 2009, at which time they will be properly destroyed.  If the 
results are published, your identity will remain confidential. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.   
 
• For further information about the study contact Alissa Stoehr, Principal Investigator, 
515-294-4640, 515-451-9359, astoehr@iastate.edu, or Dr. Steven Garasky, Major 
Professor, 515-294-9826, sgarasky@iastate.edu. 
 
• If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related 
injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or 
Director, (515) 294-3115, Office of Research Assurances, Iowa State University, 





Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study 
has been explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that 
your questions have been satisfactorily answered.  You will receive a copy of the written 
informed consent prior to your participation in the study.   
 
Participant’s Name (printed)               
    
             




I certify that the participant has been given adequate time to read and learn about the study 
and all of their questions have been answered.  It is my opinion that the participant 
understands the purpose, risks, benefits, and the procedures that will be followed in this study 
and has voluntarily agreed to participate.    
 
             












INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Title of Study: Welfare policies and covert behaviors: Understanding the  
   relationship among low-income families receiving child support 
 
Investigators: Alissa Stoehr, B.L.S., B.S. and Dr. Steven Garasky, Ph.D. 
 
This is a research study.  Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate.  




The purpose of this study is to examine the effects that covert non-compliance and covert 
support have on welfare recipients who receive child support.  Covert non-compliance is 
defined as the decision by a welfare recipient to pretend to comply with the formal child 
support system, while withholding important information from child support enforcement 
workers, such as the true identity, location, and earnings of the non-custodial parent.  Covert 
support is defined as financial and/or material contributions made by non-custodial parents 
that are not reported to the formal child support system.  
 
You are being invited to participate in this study because you are paying child support to the 
state of Iowa since the mother of your child is receiving Family Investment Program (FIP) 
assistance.  You are considered a non-custodial parent.  Your participation in this study in no 
way infers that you are participating in the covert behaviors being studied. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an audiotaped 
interview lasting approximately two hours.  During the interview, I will ask you questions 
about your current child support arrangements, your experiences with the state child support 
system, your participation in informal or covert child support arrangements, and your 
opinions about state policies related to child support.  I reserve the right to re-contact you if 
clarification is needed.  You can choose to skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
 
Each interview will be audiotaped.  The audiotape and transcript of your interview will be 
kept for one year in a locked file cabinet.  After one year, all audiotapes and paper copies of 
your interviews will be properly destroyed.  
 
I will use direct quotes in my thesis.  I will choose a pseudonym for you to use throughout 
the interview.  The interview will be held at a neutral location (e.g. not at the DHS office).  
The only people present for the interview will be you, the participant, and me, the 
interviewer.  A copy of my thesis, cleared of all identifiers, will be shared with DHS and the 
Child Support Recovery Unit (CSRU) at the completion of my research.  There is no 
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reasonable possibility that you will be identifiable in my thesis since I will follow the 




There is a risk to you if your comments about participation in covert support and/or non-
covert compliance should be disclosed or overheard by Department of Human Services or 
Child Support Recovery Unit officials.  This information could potentially put you at risk of 
losing your state assistance.  To alleviate this risk as much as possible, all interviews will 
occur in a neutral and private location with only you, the participant, and I, the interviewer, 
present.  All appropriate confidentiality measures will be followed in this study, including 




While there are likely no direct benefits to you, I hope that my study will allow your voice to 
be heard as I seek to help improve the Iowa child support system for all involved.  
 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
 
You will be compensated for participating in this study with a $20 gift card regardless of 




Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or 
leave the study at any time.  If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study 
early, it will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
Your choice of whether or not to participate in this study will not have any effect on your FIP 




Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available.  However, federal 
government regulatory agencies, auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the 
Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves human subject research 
studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality assurance and data analysis.  These 
records may contain private information.   
 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be 
taken:  Each participant will be assigned a pseudonym that will be used during the 
interview(s).  The people that will have access to the data will be the researcher and major 
professor.  The data will be stored in a locked cabinet, which the only access available will 
be to the researcher.  Any data collected from this study, including audiotapes and transcripts 
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will be kept until October 1, 2009, at which time they will be properly destroyed.  If the 
results are published, your identity will remain confidential. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.   
 
• For further information about the study contact Alissa Stoehr, Principal Investigator, 
515-294-4640, 515-451-9359, astoehr@iastate.edu, or Dr. Steven Garasky, Major 
Professor, 515-294-9826, sgarasky@iastate.edu. 
 
• If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related 
injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or 
Director, (515) 294-3115, Office of Research Assurances, Iowa State University, 





Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study 
has been explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that 
your questions have been satisfactorily answered.  You will receive a copy of the written 
informed consent prior to your participation in the study.   
 
Participant’s Name (printed)               
    
             




I certify that the participant has been given adequate time to read and learn about the study 
and all of their questions have been answered.  It is my opinion that the participant 
understands the purpose, risks, benefits, and the procedures that will be followed in this study 
and has voluntarily agreed to participate.    
 
             










DHS/CSRU Administrators and Judges 
 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Title of Study: Welfare policies and covert behaviors: Understanding the  
   relationship among low-income families receiving child support 
 
Investigators: Alissa Stoehr, B.L.S., B.S. and Dr. Steven Garasky, Ph.D. 
 
This is a research study.  Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate.  




The purpose of this study is to examine the effects that covert non-compliance and covert 
support have on welfare recipients who receive child support.  Covert non-compliance is 
defined as the decision by a welfare recipient to pretend to comply with the formal child 
support system, while withholding important information from child support enforcement 
workers, such as the true identity, location, and earnings of the non-custodial parent.  Covert 
support is defined as financial and/or material contributions made by non-custodial parents 
that are not reported to the formal child support system.  
 
You are being invited to participate in this study because you are employed by the 
Department of Human Services, Child Support Recovery Unit, or another entity within the 
state of Iowa and may have/have had direct contact with clients who have/had a current child 
support order and are/were receiving Family Investment Program (FIP) assistance through 
the state of Iowa.  You may also be able to add a legal perspective to my thesis research.   
 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an audiotaped 
interview lasting approximately two hours.  During the interview, I will ask you questions 
about your experiences with the state child support system, and your opinions about state 
policies related to child support.  I reserve the right to re-contact you if clarification is 
needed.  You can choose to skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
 
Each interview will be audiotaped.  The audiotape and transcript of your interview will be 
kept for one year in a locked file cabinet.  After one year, all audiotapes and paper copies of 
your interviews will be properly destroyed.  
 
I will use direct quotes in my thesis.  I will choose a pseudonym for you to use throughout 
the interview.  The interview will be held at a neutral location (egg. not at the DHS office).  
The only people present for the interview will be you, the participant, and me, the 
interviewer.  A copy of my thesis, cleared of all identifiers, will be shared with DHS and the 
Child Support Recovery Unit (CSRU) at the completion of my research.  There is no 
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reasonable possibility that you will be identifiable in my thesis since I will follow the 








While there are likely no direct benefits to you, I hope that my study will allow your voice to 
be heard as I seek to help improve the Iowa child support system for all involved.  
 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
 




Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or 
leave the study at any time.  If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study 




Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available.  However, federal 
government regulatory agencies, auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the 
Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves human subject research 
studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality assurance and data analysis.  These 
records may contain private information.   
 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be 
taken:  Each participant will be assigned a pseudonym that will be used during the 
interview(s).  The people that will have access to the data will be the researcher and major 
professor.  The data will be stored in a locked cabinet, which the only access available will 
be to the researcher.  Any data collected from this study, including audiotapes and transcripts 
will be kept until October 1, 2009, at which time they will be properly destroyed.  If the 









QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.   
 
• For further information about the study contact Alissa Stoehr, Principal Investigator, 
515-294-4640, 515-451-9359, astoehr@iastate.edu, or Dr. Steven Garasky, Major 
Professor, 515-294-9826, sgarasky@iastate.edu. 
 
• If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related 
injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or 
Director, (515) 294-3115, Office of Research Assurances, Iowa State University, 





Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study 
has been explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that 
your questions have been satisfactorily answered.  You will receive a copy of the written 
informed consent prior to your participation in the study.   
 
Participant’s Name (printed)               
    
             




I certify that the participant has been given adequate time to read and learn about the study 
and all of their questions have been answered.  It is my opinion that the participant 
understands the purpose, risks, benefits, and the procedures that will be followed in this study 
and has voluntarily agreed to participate.    
 
             















Interested in having your voice heard? 
 
Want to try and help change state welfare 
policy? 
 
Are you currently on welfare  
and have a child support order? 
 
 
I am looking for people who would be willing to 
participate in a study I am conducting on welfare 
policies and child support enforcement. 
Everything that is disclosed in the interviews will 
be strictly confidential. 
 
 
Compensation is available! 
 
 









APPENDIX C.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Interview questions for custodial and non-custodial parents 
 
*Not every parent will be asked every question. 
 
What is your age? 
 
What are the ages of your children? 
 
How long have you been receiving FIP payments? 
 
How many child support orders are you involved in?  Of those, how many involve the Child 
Support Recovery Unit? 
  
When were each of your child support orders established? 
 
What is the amount of your child support order? 
 
Have any child support orders ever been modified?  If so, did the award amount increase or 
decrease? 
 
Has the non-custodial parent paid any child support?  If so, how much has he or she paid in 
the last six months? 
 
How much child support are you paying each month?  If you are involved in multiple orders, 
how many involve the Child Support Recovery Unit? 
 
Tell me about your experiences with the state child support system? 
 
What do you feel are the strengths and weaknesses of the current child support system? 
 
Have your ever participated in a covert child support arrangement with the non-custodial 
parent?  If so, what were the terms of the arrangement?  If no, why not? 
 
Did your participation in a covert child support arrangement affect your income?  If so, how? 
 
Have you ever participated in an informal child support arrangement with the non-custodial 
parent?  If so, what were the terms of the arrangement?  If no, why not? 
 
Did your participation in an informal child support arrangement affect your income?  If so, 
how? 
 
Do you understand the FIP policies as they pertain to child support receipt and child support 
payment?  If not, what has been the most difficult to understand 
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What are your feelings about these policies?  Do you consider them equitable?  Why or why 
not? 
 
Have you ever not cooperated with the state child support system?  Why or why not? 
 
Interview questions for DHS/CSRU administrators and judges 
 
What was your employment history prior to joining DHS/CSRU? 
 
How long have you been at your current position? 
 
Do you have any direct knowledge of FIP recipients participating in informal child support 
arrangements with the non-custodial parent?  If so, please explain. 
 
Do you have any direct knowledge of FIP recipients participating in covert child support 
arrangements with the non-custodial parent?  If so, please explain. 
 
What percentage of current child support cases do you believe involve informal child support 
arrangements? 
 
What percentage of current child support cases do you believe involve covert child support 
arrangements? 
 
What are your feelings about child support policies as they pertain to FIP recipients? Do you 
consider them equitable? 
 
What are your feelings about the current pass-through and disregard policies in Iowa? 
 
Do you feel that a full disregard policy or a zero-disregard policy would be beneficial to FIP 
recipients? 
 
What do you feel is the level of understanding by FIP recipients of FIP and child support 
policies?  Of pass-through and disregard policies? 
 
What do you feel are the strengths and weaknesses of the current child support system? 
 
What, if anything, is being done to decrease the creation of informal support arrangements 
between custodial and non-custodial parents? 
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